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JPRS Report

Proliferation Issues

PROLIFERATION ISSUES

JPRS-TND-92-011

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15 April 1992

[This report contains foreign media information on issues related to worldwide proliferation and transfer activities in nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, including delivery systems and the transfer of weapons-relevant technologies.]

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SOUTH AFRICA

Quest for Missile Technology Damaging Image

92AF0595D Johannesburg BEELD in Afrikaans
4 Mar 92 p 6

[News report by Freek Swart: "Armcor Is Threat to South African Relations: Cabinet Would 'Pull Organization Up Short'"]

[Text] Washington—The worldwide activities of Armcor [Armaments Corporation of South Africa] are threatening South Africa's international relations, which have improved drastically over the past two years, thanks to President F.W. de Klerk's reform steps, BEELD has learned on good authority.

This is especially true of relations with the United States, Great Britain, Germany, and France, which are playing a leading role in the normalization of South Africa's position in the international community.

According to BEELD's information, the situation has become so serious that it has been placed on the agenda of the South African cabinet. There was even talk of a possible cabinet resolution this week to "pull Armcor up short."

Because of the referendum, a cabinet resolution on the matter cannot be adopted until later.

According to BEELD's information, Western governments have again lodged official objections with South Africa concerning Armcor's activities in their countries.

This concerns, among other things, Armcor agents who are attempting to acquire missile and arms technology

abroad, and Armcor attempts to dispose of the outstanding weaponry developed and produced in South Africa during the sanction years on the international market.

In various cases, the cooperation between South Africa and Israel plays an important role. BEELD was told by people in U.S. Government circles that this brings with it a torrent of objections from Arab and African countries, with requests that the United Nations (UN) do something about it.

For example, the U.S. intelligence service has reportedly determined that Israel exported key components for ballistic missiles to South Africa last year.

This was why the United States on 15 October imposed a two-year ban on the import and export of missile-related Armcor equipment.

The sanctions were imposed by force of last year's U.S. defense legislation, which orders the President to act against foreign companies or countries that violate the 1987 international convention on missile technology transfers.

In a UN report, it was hinted that South Africa would like to acquire a rocket with technical details and plans as a model for its own missile research and development. Armcor is subject to a UN arms embargo against South Africa.

It was recently reported in the United States that top officials from Armcor have complained publicly that the United States is impairing Armcor's attempts to acquire new overseas markets now that South Africa's defense budget is shrinking.

It is known that for some time now U.S. officials have been trying to keep South Africa from obtaining sensitive missile technology.

Scientists Develop Key Nuclear Reactor Material

*OW2903133192 Beijing XINHUA in English
1321 GMT 29 Mar 92*

[Text] Beijing, March 29 (XINHUA)—Scientists at the China Nuclear Power Engineering Institute have successfully developed titanium stainless steel, a key material used in a new generation nuclear reactor.

Scientists at the Chengdu-based institute said very few countries have the capability to produce the material, which is used in the manufacture of fuel components for the fast neutron breeder.

The fast neutron breeder, a new generation nuclear reactor, efficiently uses 60-70 percent of uranium fuel, compared to only 1-2 percent used in a conventional thermal-neutron reactor.

The scientists disclosed that China is accelerating the development of fast neutron breeders.

Syria, Ghana To Get Micro Nuclear Reactors

*OW1004061992 Beijing XINHUA in English
0555 GMT 10 Apr 92*

[Text] Beijing, April 10 (XINHUA)—China will export micro nuclear reactors to Ghana and Syria, following the completion of a Chinese reactor in Pakistan.

The reactors are mainly used to provide neutron sources for the analysis of neutron activation. They can determine the content of most known elements.

According to the contract, China will export a reactor to Ghana through the International Atomic Energy Organization. The contract involves 1.10 million U.S. dollars.

Moreover, the organization has approved the import by Syria of a similar 30-kw micro nuclear reactor from China and its necessary fuel.

The Chinese Atomic Energy Research institute is handling these deals.

AUSTRALIA

Nuclear Waste Research Pact With China Eyed

BK0204044692 Hong Kong AFP in English
0406 GMT 2 Apr 92

[Text] Sydney, April 2 (AFP)—China has agreed to help research and develop an Australian technique for sealing radioactive waste in man-made rock, government scientists said here Thursday.

"Initially we will assist them to develop Synroc," said Adam Jostesons, director of the advanced materials programme for the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO).

"The benefit to us is that we will get access to radioactive waste, since Australia does not have a nuclear energy program."

Synroc is an artificial combination of naturally occurring rocks which are known to be impervious to radioactivity.

ANSTO has spent about 25 million dollars (19 million U.S.) over 12 years to develop Synroc, which it believes is more reliable than the glass containers used in countries with commercial nuclear programmes.

The commonest nuclear fuel is uranium, one of the few naturally occurring radioactive substances.

"Nature has contained this material in rocks for thousands, if not millions, of years," ANSTO spokesman Chris Tweedie explained, "so we thought why not look at how it does that and try to simulate it by man-made methods."

A typical nuclear power station generating 1,000 megawatts of electricity produces 30 tonnes of spent fuel yearly. Once uranium and plutonium have been recovered for recycling in reactors, about one tonne of high-level waste is left.

The waste requires between 100,000 and a million years to decay to acceptable levels of radioactivity, and the traditional way of disposing of it is to bury it in 40-gallon (200-litre) containers made of borosilicate—glass containing huge amounts of lead.

"Radioactive materials generate heat, and there are fears that borosilicate may develop cracks and leach contaminated water into the earth," Tweedie said.

"The process may take place over centuries, but we need to lock up radioactive byproducts for hundreds of thousands of years."

Documents published by ANTISO assert that Synroc, which is made from the oxides of titanium, zirconium, calcium, barium and aluminium, is "at least 1,000 times more resistant to leaching than borosilicate" in boiling water at 100 degrees Celsius.

The advantage increases at higher temperatures, the documents say, and "glass flakes and cracks badly after a few days' exposure to high-pressure water at 300 degrees Celsius."

The waste which ANTISO will be using in experiments in China "comes from defence programs," Jostesons said.

"It is not dissimilar to reactor waste but is fairly diluted in fission materials."

Jostesons described the agreement with China as "just the beginnings of our cooperation" and said it provided for "one-man exchanges."

ANTISO is already collaborating on similar research programs in Japan, Italy and Britain.

SOUTH KOREA

Inspection Regulations Compared With DPRK

SK0504151392 Seoul CHUNGANG ILBO
in Korean 5 Apr 92 p 2

[Article on the contents of the draft regulations on South-North Korean nuclear inspection, by reporter Kim Chin-kuk]

[Text] An item-by-item comparison of the South side's draft regulations governing South-North mutual nuclear inspections with the North's draft regulations on inspection designed to verify the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, both of which CHUNGANG ILBO exclusively obtained on 4 April, is as follows:

Kinds, Frequency, and Period of Inspections (Paragraph 2)

Where the South proposes that regular inspections be kept separate from special inspections, that the regular inspections be conducted every quarter, with each inspection occurring within a seven-day limit, and that special inspections be limited to 12 rounds a year, with each inspection having a five-day time limit, the North side proposes in Paragraph 16 of its draft that inspections be conducted according to what the two sides find agreeable.

Inspection Team (Paragraph 3)

Where the South side proposes that a list of no more than 50 names be exchanged and kept by each side; that the inspection teams be composed of no more than 15 members and headed by members of the Joint Nuclear Control Committee; and that these teams can be split up into smaller teams of more than three members at each site, the North side proposes in Paragraph 14 that inspections teams covering nuclear bases be composed of 10 members; that teams covering the nuclear facilities be composed of five members or so; and that namelists be exchanged within 10 days of the regulations on inspections becoming effective.

Targets of Inspection (Paragraph 4)

Where the South side proposes that inspections be conducted at 56 sites a year, with regular ones occurring at 16 and special ones at 40 sites, limiting the number of military bases to within 20, the North uses in Paragraph 3 an abstract concept that the targets of inspection be chosen based on the principle of simultaneously dissipating misgivings caused by nuclear weapons. Also, the North side proposes that nuclear weapons and nuclear bases be made targets of inspection when the past and present existence of nuclear weapons (Paragraph 8) and nuclear material and nuclear facilities (Paragraph 10) can be proved objectively.

Exchange of Information (Paragraph 5)

The South side's proposal calls for information on the nuclear facilities already in existence to be exchanged within 10 days after the regulations on inspection are adopted; for information on new ones to be exchanged at the same a report is submitted to the International Atomic Energy Agency; and for information on any changes to be exchanged within 15 days after their occurrence. Also, the South side proposes that data on inspections requested through the Joint Nuclear Control Committee be provided within 15 days after it meets; when requested, data on inspections be given immediately upon the arrival of the nuclear inspection teams for regular inspections, and data requested by the inspection teams for special inspections to be provided right away.

The North side proposes that data on nuclear weapons and nuclear bases be given 10 days before the inspections; that additional data be given within a week of a request being made, regardless of in whose possession it may be (Paragraph); that data on nuclear facilities and nuclear material be given within 10 days before the inspections and data on new ones six months before the related nuclear materials are brought in (Paragraph 11).

Procedures of Inspections (Paragraph 6)

The South side's proposal says that in the case of regular inspections, the two sides exchange inspection schedules at the meeting of the Joint Nuclear Control Committee and the party hosting the inspection provide transportation for the inspectors, while in the case of special inspections, the inspection schedule be given to the hosting party 24 hours before the arrival of the inspectors and the hosting party provide guidance for the inspectors to the sites within six hours of receiving an inspection schedule.

The North side proposes that information on inspections be given to the hosting party five days before the actual inspection take place. (Paragraph 9)

Methods of Inspection (Paragraph 6)

The South side would allow for the installation of sealed surveillance equipment (closed circuit TV), along with eyewitness inspections, sample-taking for tests, the use of

measuring equipment, photographing, recording, videotaping, the use of writing materials, and analyzing equipment. The South side also would allow for asking on the spot questions, along with free use of communications equipment, telephones, and radios. (Paragraph 7)

However, the North side proposes that inspections be conducted as a way of verifying the results of examination by employing an accounting and supervision system of the nuclear material currently in use and that these be decided according to agreement between the two sides (Paragraph 12) and that inspection equipment and means be decided according to agreement between the two sides (Paragraph 16). Actually, the North side would prohibit inspectors from installing equipment by barring them from approaching the nuclear material and nuclear facilities without consent from the party hosting the inspection under the excuse that operation of nuclear facilities cannot be allowed to be interfered with. (Paragraph 13)

Guarantee of Personal Safety and Offer of Convenience (Paragraph 7)

The South side proposes that the host side form a guidance team headed by one member of the Joint Nuclear Control Committee and provide the inspectors with an office, office supplies, and communications facilities. The North side's proposal, too, stipulates that guidance, site maps, and other necessary data be provided.

Settlement of Disputes (Paragraph 8)

Where the South side insists on quick settlement of disputes occurring in the course of inspection Joint Nuclear Control Committee meetings, the North side has no specific proposals on this.

Results of Inspection and Their Correction (Paragraph 9)

Where the South side proposes that the findings of inspections be submitted to the Joint Nuclear Control Committee at the next meeting and that the nuclear control committee will analyze and assess them and then take measures, such as ordering the discontinuation of the facilities, sealing, and abolition, and verify them at the next round of inspection.

The North side proposes that reports on the results of inspections be made after having the head of the inspection team and officer of the host side in charge of inspection sign on them (Paragraph 20), that the Joint Nuclear Control Committee discuss the reports at a meeting to be called within 10 days after the conclusion of the inspection (Paragraph 21), and that inspections be conducted continuously in sites where nuclear weapons exist at the request of any one side (Paragraph 22).

Correction, Supplement (Paragraph 10)

Both sides propose that correction and supplements be made in accordance with agreement between the two sides.

Effectuation (Paragraph 11)

Where the South side proposes that the regulations be put into effect the day they are signed, the North side insists that they be put into effect simultaneously with the effectuation of the agreement on implementation.

Communications While the Committee Is in Recess (Paragraph 12)

Where the South side proposes that all manner of notification, bulletins, supplies of information, and exchange

of information during the recession of the Joint Nuclear Control Committee be made through the South-North liaison office, the North side has no specific regulations on this.

Miscellaneous

The South side proposes that a supplementary agreement include the form of information exchange (supplementary 1) and the form for making the inspection schedule (supplementary 2), whereas the North proposes that the regulations of inspection be supplementary to the "proposal for an agreement on implementing the joint declaration on denuclearization."

POLAND**Nuclear Arms Exporters Urge Tighter Controls**

*LD0404163892 Warsaw PAP in English
2211 GMT 3 Apr 92*

[Text] Warsaw, April 3—Participants in a conference of member states of the nuclear suppliers' group, which wound up in Warsaw on Friday, urged the states which emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union to renounce the use of nuclear arms and join the treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). They also called on these states to accept all safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and tighten control of exports of materials and devices used in the production of nuclear weapons.

Twenty-seven member states of the group set the principles and terms under which nuclear materials and equipment might be transferred. Ukraine who participated in the conference was granted an observer status.

The participating states agreed to introduce the international supervision over materials, technologies and equipment of "double application," that is used both for peaceful and military purposes.

"It is an important step towards tightening control of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons," Polish Foreign Ministry (MSZ) official Wladyslaw Klaczynski said. In MSZ's assessment, the move is taking on a new meaning in the face of a more real threat for the international security resulting from the use of fissionable materials for developing and producing nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.

The member states of the group agreed to accept IAEA full safeguards for all activities of importing states as a precondition of supplies. They called on all prospective exporters of nuclear weapons to adhere to the control regulations applied by the states of the nuclear suppliers's group.

BRAZIL

Russia Offers 'Ultra-Sensitive' Technology

PY0804125092

[Editorial Report] Sao Paulo O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO on 27 March publishes on page 10 a 500-word article entitled "Russians Offer To Work in Brazil" and a 450-word article entitled "Curricula Received From Engineers." They are both by William Waack and refer to offers made to the Brazilian Embassy in Moscow.

Waack says that since the disintegration of the USSR, the Brazilian Embassy has received an average of 10 offers per week. The offers include information on ultra-sensitive radar equipment, MiG-29 planes, high-quality aluminum, material developed for space programs, night vision equipment, and tear gas, among others. He adds that experts in the fields of space, electronics, electrochemistry, nuclear physics, semiconductors, genetic engineering, traumatology, and eye microsurgery have offered their services, saying they are willing to work in Brazil for two or three years. He explains that the embassy has sent the 60 best offers to Brazil but, so far, they have received no answers.

Waack points out that businessmen and experienced Brazilian diplomats believe that some of these offers are not genuine, but adds that even the skeptics admit that if Brazil does not accept these offers, it will be overlooking excellent opportunities to acquire "advanced technology that is often internationally restricted" at a very low price.

Waack reports that since November 1991, five mixed Russian-Brazilian enterprises have been set up, at least one of which is working in the "informatics area and fears retaliation from industrialized countries." He added: "In the field of mechanics, three more joint ventures have been created."

Waack concludes by saying that there is great expectation surrounding the visit of 18 entrepreneurs of the Funding Authority for Studies and Projects, FINEP, to Moscow in early May. This visit will coincide with

Foreign Minister Rezek's arrival in Russia on 10 May. He quotes a Brazilian diplomatic source in Moscow as saying: "We have received no reply about the Russian scientists who are willing to go to Brazil or who wish to sell products and technology to Brazil. We get the impression that people in Brazil do not have the slightest idea of the opportunities they are missing."

Navy Views Nuclear Submarine Research Progress

PY0804215692 Rio de Janeiro O GLOBO
in Portuguese 30 Mar 92 p 13

[By Jose Henrique Alves]

[Text] The Navy's Special Projects Coordinating Board (Copesp) has taken another step forward in the development of the first Brazilian nuclear submarine. The Copesp began testing 600 ultracentrifuges used in the uranium enrichment process last year, and the system should become operational at the end of this year.

The ultracentrifuges are part of the first full-size "cascade" (called zero module) part of the initial stage of the Admiral Alvaro Alberto Testing Plant that will enrich uranium to 20 percent. The plant is scheduled for completion by 1996 but according to Copesp sources, the deadline will have to be changed due to budget considerations.

During a conference in Rio last week, Rear Admiral Othon Pinheiro da Silva, Copesp president, explained that the zero module will allow them to build the first Brazilian nuclear propulsion reactor.

The present situation indicates that by 1999 we will see the grand finale when the first locally developed nuclear reactor becomes operational.

The Propulsion Equipment Development Laboratory (Ladep) will begin operating this year in Aramar. The laboratory will make possible the testing of vapor equipment in real operating conditions. Further progress in the development of the submarine reactor occurred after the construction of the high-pressure thermohydraulic circuit that helped test computer methods and obtain data for the primary circuit.

PAKISTAN

Senate Urges Bomb Detonation Before Conference

92WP0189A Islamabad *THE MUSLIM in English*
13 Mar 92 p 12

[Article by Aroosa Alam]

[Text] Islamabad, March 12: "Proposed 5-Nation Conference on Nuclear Non-Proliferation in South Asia is a trap and Pakistan must explode a nuclear device before attending this moot", says Senator Tariq Chaudhry.

Taking part in the debate on the President's address to Parliament in Senate here Thursday, he said except Pakistan all other proposed participants of the conference including India are considered nuclear powers and Pakistan will be a loser if it attends the conference without detonating a bomb.

He said India exploded a nuclear device in 1974 and its nuclear status or development of nuclear programme will not be affected if it signs the NPT [Nonproliferation Treaty], Pakistan has not detonated the device and it will be in a disadvantageous position.

The member said the foundations of the country's nuclear programme were laid by late Z.A. Bhutto, who according to him told eminent scientist of the country Dr Abdul Qadeer that he (Bhutto) will make available all resources but "I want a bomb." The programme, he said, continued during President Zia's era and President Ghulam Ishaq Khan had all along been interested in its development. But he alleged that the officers sitting in the Foreign Office were toeing American policies.

Senator Tariq Chaudhry strongly opposed on Kashmir and said it was not acceptable to the people. He said the dispute should be settled in accordance with the United Nations resolutions and in the spirit of Simla agreement.

On Afghanistan, he said it is in the interest of Pakistan to seek an early settlement of the issue. But, he opined, that the United Nations peace formula was not practicable.

The Senator criticizing the Prime Minister, described him as an irresponsible ruler. He said when Gen Fazle Haq was murdered, the Prime Minister was on Sindh tour. He cut short his visit and flew to Lahore (instead of Peshawar where his close friend was assassinated) and played a cricket match at Lahore Gymkhana.

APP adds: He criticized the government, alleging that it could not protect human respect, life and property. He said the trend of crime was growing high and the efforts to check illegal weapons, provide job opportunities to youth, improve literacy rate and reform overall social set-up have failed to bring about positive results.

He demanded that the legislation regarding checking of floor crossing and giving representation to the women in the assembly should be enacted without further delay.

Taking part in the debate Syed Ehsan Shah from Balochistan said democracy was not allowed to flourish in the country. He said the politicians were not looking sincere to practice democratic values.

Democracy, he observed, was being propagating for protecting personal interests. He emphasized that national interests should be kept supreme. He called for taking such steps which help improve the lot of common man and undo injustices.

He also underlined the need of holding proper accountability of those who are at the helm of the affairs.

He was of the view that Pakistan should not go for atomic bomb and concentrate to develop friendly relations with India. He said defence expenditure should be curtailed and national resources be devoted to the welfare of the people.

Senator Dr Rehan criticized the role of Opposition played on the occasion of the Presidential address. He said that in 1970, for the first time fair and free elections were held but a party in minority said "idher hum udher tum" which led to dismemberment of Pakistan. The government of Sardar Mengal in Balochistan was dismissed and a number of amendments were made in the Constitution. The formation of "Federal Security Force" (FSF) and Hyderabad Tribunal were the symbols of tyranny of that government, he observed.

Dr Rehan said that he was of the view that Center should keep only four departments with itself including defence, foreign affairs, currency and communications. This will lead to realization of the dream of greater provincial autonomy.

Regarding Kalabagh Dam, he stressed the need for taking a consensus decision.

He proposed early return of Afghan refugees to their homeland, complete overhaul of police and setting up a commission for this purpose. Kashmir problem should be resolved in light of Simla Accord, he demanded.

The debate was inconclusive, when the House was adjourned to meet again on Sunday at 10 am.

Dr Noor Jehan Panezai, who was in the chair said the House would take up private business on Sunday, while the debate on the Presidential address would resume on Monday.

Commentary Views Nuclear Proliferation Stance

92WP0189B Islamabad *THE MUSLIM in English*
13 Mar 92 p 7

[Excerpts] The Western campaign against nuclear proliferation is reaching its climax. The Pentagon document—excerpts of which have been published in Sunday's *NEW YORK TIMES*, and which codifies the United States perception of the New World Order into a clear-cut

policy framework for the next decade or so, emphasizes military action against the would-be proliferators like India and Pakistan.

Following France, China, the last remaining major nuclear power which had been a staunch opponent of the NPT [Nonproliferation Treaty], also concluded the Treaty on Monday.

India has refused to follow suit. Indian Foreign Secretary N.J. Dixit has made it clear to his counterparts at the U.S. State Department that his country would neither sign the NPT, nor would it attend the American-backed conference on nuclear proliferation in South Asia, originally proposed by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in June last year.

Pakistan is currently a silent spectator of the whole affair. The Foreign Office officials after issuing the usual contradictory statements on the nuclear question during the last two months—one saying Pakistan has the capability to manufacture one nuclear device, the other maintaining that the country's nuclear programme is solely meant for peaceful purposes—have yet to take a firm stand on the issue. Which way they decide to go, proliferation or control of nuclear weapons in South Asia, would decide whether or not the country would be able to survive honorably among the comity of nations, at least during the period the Pentagon sources say the United States would lead the world as the only super power.[passage omitted]

Signing of the NPT [Non Proliferation Treaty] by China may come as a shock to Pakistan. It will however marginally affect the Chinese perception of nuclear proliferation. Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen while concluding the NPT at 10 Downing Street has unequivocally stated that policies on nuclear proliferation should not "impair the just rights and interests of the member countries pursuing peaceful uses of nuclear power."

The West has more than once accused China of exporting ballistic missiles technology to Pakistan, Iran and Syria, and therefore violating the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). China refutes such charges.

China has brought about some significant changes in its foreign policy only in response to bitter realities of the existing international set-up which is not likely to remain as such forever. By signing the NPT and recognizing Israel it has no doubt wooed the United States. The spirit of cooperation and accommodation also denotes Sino-Indian ties for the time being.

However, given the increasing collaboration between India and the United States in the defence field, and the latter's ambition to rule the world on its own, China would never abandon Pakistan as its most trusted ally in the region—since it is Pakistan which would help China

extend its influence in West Asia and Central Asia, regions where both India and the United States have hegemonic aspirations.

Since China was a nuclear power before the NPT was concluded, the signing of the NPT would not hamper its nuclear policies. Like other nuclear states it will be able to upgrade its nuclear potential. China will also be free to export nuclear technology to the countries aspiring for peaceful uses of nuclear energy. That such a technology will be used to produce nuclear energy or weapons is a decision which the recipients—be it Pakistan—have to take.

As regards Mr Dixit's stand in Washington Tuesday on nuclear proliferation, the Foreign Office must chalk out all possible avenues to preempt any Indian move on the issue in the days to come. In a clear-cut departure from his country's previously followed policy on the question of nuclear proliferation in South Asia, Mr Dixit during his discourse with U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger has talked about resolving this issue through bilateral negotiations, something Pakistan has been trying to initiate for more than a decade.

What kind of arrangement on nuclear proliferation would the Indians offer to Pakistan when the next round of their Foreign Secretaries level talks is held? Should Pakistan trust India if the latter offers some confidence-building measures in this context? Would the United States try to contain Indian hegemonic ambitions in South Asia and the Indian Ocean by strictly following the Pentagon's new military strategy or would it bail India out of this, as the State Department has promised to do so, even going to the extent of allowing India to enter the nuclear club before it concludes the NPT? And, in view of the latest developments, will it be feasible for Pakistan to continue following a policy of 'wait and see' or mere ambiguous gestures in its nuclear stance?

These are the questions which the Foreign Office needs to address carefully.

SAUDI ARABIA

Minister Denies Missile Technology Passed to China

LD0704214792 Riyadh SPA in Arabic 2015 GMT
7 Apr 92

[Excerpt] Tabuk, 7 Apr (SPA)—His Royal Highness Prince Sultan Bin-'Abd-al-'Aziz, second deputy prime minister, minister of defense and aviation, and inspector general, has denied claims by some news media, including Israeli media, that the Kingdom has informed China about Patriot missile technology. His highness said: "Claims that the Kingdom has informed China about Patriot missile technology are an Israeli lie. We are accustomed to these lies." [passage omitted]

U.S. Stance on Arms Proliferation Questioned*PM2503155492 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 24 Mar 92 p 3*

["Rejoinder" by V. Afanasyev: "Nuclear Fist for Israel!"]

[Text] Due to the West's obviously deliberate concern for the future of the former Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal other aspects of the problem of atomic weapons nonproliferation in "third countries" have receded into the shadow for a while. The agreement between the International Atomic Energy Agency and the DPRK on putting all nuclear installations and radioactive materials in North Korea under international control has gone without comment. Libya's statement to the effect that all its nuclear installations are henceforth open for international inspection has also gone unnoticed. Only because the United States did not want to hear this, preoccupied as it is with compiling scenarios for missile and bomb strikes on "atomic centers" in Iraq, North Korea, and Libya. It is quite possible that Washington will try to win Security Council support in this. What guarantee is there that these plans will not meet with support from the now very pliable representatives of Russia and the former USSR's other republics?

There are grounds for these fears. The position espoused by the USSR in the 29 November Security Council in voting in favor of Resolution No. 678 predetermined the bombing of Iraq, the destruction of its infrastructure, and the undermining of its economy—and all this ultimately brought about the very real genocide of the Iraqi people, which is continuing to this day.

Now Bush within the framework of his election campaign is proposing to inflict another series of repressive bombing and missile attacks on Iraq. Yet if the Washington administration is taking such zealous care to avert the spread of nuclear weapons, why is it keeping quiet about Israel's atomic weapons? The fact that Tel Aviv was ready to use these weapons against Arab countries during the 1973 war has already been mentioned several times.

So why is the whole "democratic" press zealously "exposing" Iraq, Libya, the DPRK, and lastly Iran, but keeping quiet when it comes to Israel and South Korea? The latter was until recently stuffed with U.S. nuclear weapons, which naturally the United States did not admit until it announced their withdrawal from the country.

The answer can be found in an interview that D. Ivri [name as transliterated], director of the Israeli Defense Ministry, gave KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA's correspondent: "The difference between us and the Arabs is that Israel is a democratic country. Democrats take a far more responsible approach to all matters of domestic and foreign policy." The deeds of Israeli "democracy" are well-known. They include the recent bombing of Lebanon, the annexation of the Golan Heights, and the

terrorizing of the Palestinian people. The whole world has long been told that the West Bank of the Jordan and the Gaza Strip are "regained Israeli territories." If Arab-Israeli talks on a Near East settlement become deadlocked, after June's Knesset elections the new Israeli Government may quite well announce the annexation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

U.S. Postponement of Plutonium Deal Viewed*PM2503160192 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 24 Mar 92 Morning Edition pp 1,4*

[Report by Vladimir Mikheyev: "No U.S. Visa for Plutonium-238 Yet. Are There 'Secret Instructions' Prohibiting Soviet-U.S. Trade?"]

[Text] The talks which began in 1989 about shipments of plutonium-238 to the United States were unexpectedly broken off in late 1991. The deal, valued at \$6 million, did not receive final approval from the U.S. Department of Energy. THE NEW YORK TIMES reported 23 March. What was the motive? In the newspaper's opinion, the administration is trying to remove the threat posed by the "Russian military-industrial complex." And the method? Leaving it with starvation rations when it comes to possible foreign-exchange income.

Yet the experts themselves admit that we are talking about a radioactive isotope which is not used for military purposes. Its counterpart—plutonium-239—is used for military nuclear applications.

Nobody in Washington is offering any official explanation as to why such a major deal did not reach its logical conclusion. Various specialists unconnected with the U.S. Administration are voicing the suspicion that, since this is not the first time that similar contracts with Russia have been blocked, there may possibly be some "secret instructions" prohibiting trade.

The IZVESTIYA Editorial Office turned for additional information to Aleksey Antonovich Grigoryev, director of the "Uranservis" firm, which is part of the "Tekhsnabeksport" joint-stock company:

"Indeed, talks on the sale of plutonium-238 to the United States have been under way for more than two years. This radioactive isotope which emits thermal neutrons is intended for an interesting NASA (National Aeronautics and Space Administration) project—namely, the use of plutonium-238 as an electric generator during the planned Mars mission.

"Currently," A. Grigoryev continued, "as a result of the winding up of military programs, opportunities have emerged for recovering and chemically cleaning plutonium-238, which is considered to be a high-tech product. The technology used to produce it has already proved itself in Russia. Our proposal was accepted and approved at the middle level at the U.S. Department of Energy. Last year we supplied a sample and, as far as I

am aware, it passed the test. But then things got bogged down. Some people claim that the Americans themselves are able to obtain plutonium-238 from their reactors. That is true. But specialists have already worked out that their costs would be a higher order of magnitude. It would be far more advantageous for them to acquire Russian plutonium. We are hoping that a deal will ultimately be struck."

...According to Assistant Secretary William Young, who deals with nuclear energy matters, the U.S. Government is still "looking at the opportunities" for concluding a contract for the delivery of plutonium-238 from Russia. W. Young did not name the authorities which had clearly shelved the deal.

There is every reason to believe that traditional American pragmatism will once again prevail over the desire to punish the "Russian military-industrial complex"—whatever it may mean. Moreover, does this not constitute material help in implementing conversion? Plutonium-238, which is intended for peaceful purposes, is produced at former "military" reactors thanks to legally earned U.S. dollars. The aim is entirely noble.

Reports Continue on Exports of Uranium

Kyrgyz President Explains

PM2303170192 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
20 Mar 92 Morning Edition p 1

[Report by Nikolay Paklin: "Kyrgyzstan Offers Uranium for Export"]

[Excerpt] Delhi—[passage omitted] The second question concerned the presence in Kyrgyzstan of nuclear weapons and nuclear technologies. The Kyrgyz leader's response caused a sensation here.

"There are no nuclear weapons or nuclear weapon components in the republic. We do produce a large quantity of enriched uranium, however. Our uranium was used in the first Soviet atomic and thermonuclear bombs and at nuclear power stations. We are willing to sell enriched uranium to other countries. If India needs it, I do not think that there will be any problem in reaching an agreement on shipments of this material. Kyrgyzstan will not allow enriched uranium to escape to 'undesirable' countries, however. The International Atomic Energy Agency and the United Nations must name those countries...."

This statement from A. Akayev caused India to heave a sigh of relief. A great deal has been said in Delhi about the possibility of the development of a "Muslim atomic bomb." The CIS Central Asian republics, which possess various nuclear technologies and scientific cadres, have been named as potential participants in this. Fears have even been voiced that nuclear weapons sited in Kazakhstan might fall into the hands of Islamic fundamentalists. [passage omitted]

Atomic 'Fraudsters' Investigated

PM0304121392 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
2 Apr 92 Morning Edition p 5

[Article by Aleksey Portanskiy: "Export of Nuclear Technology Should Be Legal Only. This Can Be Achieved Only Through Joint Efforts"]

[Excerpt] A new sensitive topic connected with our country—"the uncontrolled leak of nuclear materials from the former USSR"—has appeared in the Western mass media. At the same time another topic, closely related to the first and concerning the alleged ongoing recruitment of our nuclear scientists for work in third countries, is being developed. The common conclusion automatically prompted by these and other articles, as it were, is that the development of an "Islamic" or some kind of "Asian" nuclear bomb could be speeded up and that a certain proportion of the blame for this should be borne by Russia and the other CIS countries in view of the economic and political confusion prevailing there. How warranted are these anxieties?

Russia and the Uranium Market

The United States is justifiably regarded as the arbiter of prices in the world market in enriched uranium through long-term contracts. The United States controls at least 50 percent of the uranium market. Two European consortiums account for about 40 percent. According to estimates by the "Tekhnosnabeksport" foreign economic joint-stock company, the sole official supplier of enriched uranium and other nuclear materials in Russia, we account for 7-8 percent of the market. However, the former USSR does account for roughly 45 percent of known reserves of uranium in the world, one-third of which is found in Russia. Our capacities for producing and further reprocessing enriched uranium constitute around one-quarter of the world's capacities and are located exclusively on Russian territory.

"Our share of the world's uranium export should, of course, be significantly greater than it is today," A. Shishkin, chairman of the "Tekhnosnabeksport" All-Union Association [V/O] Board, said in conversation with me. "We aspire to 25 percent. We first entered the world market in natural and enriched uranium in 1990, prior to that we merely offered our services in respect of enriching uranium from a client's raw materials. The market was naturally already divided up by that time, and our appearance in it was bound to produce opposition from the main suppliers. The country is now undergoing disarmament and the rate of construction of nuclear electric power stations [AES], in view of the accident at Chernobyl, has declined. It is clear that a surplus of natural and enriched uranium has built up in our country. We are now being accused of dumping, of trading at give-away prices. In actual fact there have been no give-away prices, although we are indeed in a position to supply nuclear materials at prices below those of our competitors. But there is more to it than that.

"There is a market based on long-term contracts where the price is established by the Americans and stands at approximately \$100 [as published] per kilogram. But, in addition, there also exists the so-called secondary market in which trade is carried out in terms of short-term supplies, that is to say one to three years instead of 10-20 years. Here prices are entirely free, market prices, and they are often substantially lower. As we did not have the chance to sign advantageous long-term contracts 10-15 years ago, we are now forced to work the secondary market strenuously in the hope of establishing ourselves in the other market sometime. In 1990-1992 we concluded a number of contracts, and everything was proceeding normally until November last, until, that is, the Americans and French accused us of dumping. We reject the charge and have therefore sent the necessary documentation to our competitors and are ready to argue our case. Unfortunately, the charges leveled against us at a certain stage are now becoming indiscriminate, no one bothers to make precise calculations any more, it is simply claimed that we are not a country based on a market economy and therefore we are sowing discord and seeking to undermine the foundations [of the market]. As a result they are threatening to introduce swinging duties and other measures. Meanwhile not a single case of nuclear material having really come from Russia or the Commonwealth has yet been proven."

Uranium Market Has Its Con Men Too

I learned the truth of this claim by telephoning the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] in Vienna. As a Russian expert working at the organization told me, reports of the seizure of enriched uranium or plutonium allegedly exported from the former USSR have recently been received from Hungary, Italy, Switzerland, Austria, and Mozambique. However, the upshot has been that either the material is not ours, it belongs to "Tekhnosnabeksport," that is to say it is legal, or is natural uranium. As far as the uranium pellets in the FRG—shown on television in many countries—are concerned, this is still under investigation.

On the other hand, according to IAEA data, cases of "atomic fraud" have markedly increased of late: There is a steadily growing number of fraudsters who have no qualms about offering all kinds of bogus material in a bid to get rich.

I was able to verify that no reports of the sale of nuclear materials in our country were received until recently on talking with the leadership of official organs such as the State Committee for the Supervision of Nuclear and Radiation Safety under the Russian president and the Committee for Conversion Affairs under the Russian president.

"I would highlight two aspects of the approach of our Western competitors to all the furor surrounding the appearance of clandestine nuclear materials in Europe," said M. Bazhanov, chairman of the Committee for Conversion Affairs, who was quite recently invited to a

studio of French Television's Channel 3 to view a sensational video. It purportedly showed a deal involving the sale of fissile material to the West taking place in a Moscow apartment. First, the idea is being instilled in public opinion that there is a total lack of control over the storage of warheads and nuclear materials and that it is essential to set up strict external control over the whole of this complex on Russian territory if the worst is to be avoided. Of course the aim here is to prevent any enhancement of Russia's position in the world market in nuclear materials. To date we have received no answer to a single one of our proposals regarding the joint investigation of all these incidents here.

According to a report by IZVESTIYA correspondent Valeriy Rudnev, Mikhail Bazhanov stated at a 30 March news conference for Russian and foreign journalists: A pretty small circle of scientists possessing the appropriate knowledge work at nuclear installations. None of them is trying to leave Russia or to conclude contracts with Western firms. Articles in the foreign and domestic press about nuclear technology leaks from this country and the departure of Russian nuclear scientists abroad were also rebutted by Aleksandr Gurov, deputy chief of the Russian Federation Security Ministry Public Relations Center. [passage omitted]

International Reserves Considered

LD0804193792 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1127 GMT 8 Apr 92

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Vyacheslav Bantin]

[Text] Tokyo April 8—Russia now considers the possibilities of setting up international uranium reserves. The volume of uranium enough to cover world needs for three years will result from the destruction of nuclear armaments of the former USSR. Yevgeniy Velikhov, vice president of the Russian Academy of Sciences, now visiting in Tokyo announced this at a news conference at Japan's Science and Technology Agency on Tuesday [7 April], the newspaper ASAHI reported in its Wednesday issue.

The newspaper reports the main suppliers of uranium are now concerned that the uranium resulting from the dismantling of Soviet nuclear weapons may be dumped on the world market, causing the plummeting of prices of this important raw material and destabilising the market. Velikhov said that the plan of creating international Uranium reserves has the purpose of preventing such developments, when members of the Commonwealth of Independent States export their "surplus" uranium.

He said that a huge amount of plutonium from 50 to 100 tonnes will also result from dismantling nuclear weapons in the Commonwealth countries. If this volume of plutonium is transformed into fuel for nuclear stations, it will be enough for steady operation of all nuclear power stations in the world for 20 years. Velikhov said the

members of the Commonwealth of Independent States need cooperation of other countries to use resources of plutonium and uranium effectively in peaceful purposes.

Security Ministry on Sales, Thefts

*PM3103085492 Moscow TRUD in Russian
31 Mar 92 p 1*

[Report by Yu. Dmitriyev on 30 Mar briefing at Russian Ministry of Security: "Uranium 'Forgery'"]

[Text] Frightening talk of the theft and resale abroad of uranium, plutonium, and other bomb components has suddenly flared up with renewed force both here at home and especially abroad. These questions, along with the nuclear situation in Russia in general, were the subject of yesterday's briefing at the Ministry of Security.

Those present included prominent nuclear scientists, leaders of that formidable sector that used to be known as "medium machine building," and generals of the special services that protect our quiet lives. There are certainly plenty of rumors. A pseudodocumentary film is being shown all over Paris, depicting scenes of the buying and selling of treacherous plutonium. A certain prosecutor from Italy declares loudly that he is in charge of a much-publicized investigation into the unlawful activity of as many as 30 Russian military specialists who have offered nuclear ammunition to the West. Mikhail Bazhanov, chairman of the State Committee for Conversion, who has recently returned from France, spoke at the briefing, and stated that in his opinion this is a pure forgery, the film is simply incomprehensible. Moreover, the company refused to allow the Russian authorities to see it in order to carry out even an elementary investigation.

Mikhail Dedyukhin, a colonel in the security service, said: "We do not know of a single instance of the transfer abroad of a single gram of nuclear components, let alone several of our missiles, as has been reported in the press. We recently investigated a businessman from St. Petersburg whom the German magazine DER SPIEGEL had also declared to be a 'dealer' in lethal goods. There is no confirmation of this, and the businessman himself complained in writing about the press provocation."

Many questions were also put to Doctor of Sciences Stanislav Kaznovskiy, an IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] expert, who firmly rejected attacks on nuclear power. It exists all over the world, and in the conditions of the mounting energy crisis it would be madness to abandon nuclear power stations. What we should do instead is to think about improving the reactors and enhancing their reliability.

The stories of some ultraradioactive substance called "red mercury," costing fabulous sums, also proved to be anecdotal. This also had to be looked into by the Security Ministry's service headed by General Gennadiy Kuznetsov. Scientists provided assistance here. Academician Yuriy Buslayev, a prominent scientist in the

sphere of inorganic materials, told journalists: We carefully examined a vessel given to us by the Security Ministry containing the mysterious mixture called "red mercury." The only red color came from... the retort. The rest was regular mercury, the kind you get in medical thermometers. Someone had the idea of making a profit out of this substance. This too is a "forgery."

More on Nuclear Equipment, Technology Exports

Yeltsin Decrees Control on Exports

*PM0304114392 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 3 Apr 92 First Edition p 4*

[Decree No. 312 of the Russian Federation president "On Control Over the Export of Nuclear Materials, Equipment, and Technologies From the Russian Federation," signed by Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin and dated Moscow, the Kremlin, 27 March 1992]

[Text] With the aim of strengthening control over the export of nuclear materials, equipment, and technologies from the Russian Federation, I resolve:

To determine that the export of nuclear materials and of technologies, equipment, assemblies, and special nonnuclear materials designed for their processing, utilization, or production from the Russian Federation to any state not possessing nuclear weapons can be carried out only provided that the entire nuclear activity of this state is placed under the guarantee of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

The Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs is to make the appropriate statement on this question.

[Signed] Russian Federation President B. Yeltsin

[Dated] Moscow, the Kremlin, 27 March 1992

Stockholm Institute Issues Report

*92400109B Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 13 Mar 92 p 2*

[Article by Yuriy Sigov (Stockholm-Moscow): "Who Is Buying Soviet Tanks? We Are Disarming Ourselves So That We Can Arm Others"]

[Text] For many years the volume of arms exports from the USSR was one of our biggest secrets. Now the union's heir, the Russian leadership, has made an official and unequivocal announcement of its willingness to continue trading in weapons and materiel abroad. In spite of the "openness" of statements of this kind, including those made by officials in the Russian Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations (see NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 19 February 1992), the actual quantities and types of arms that are being exported and the list of foreign clients are still not being published in their entirety.

The publications of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), whose research includes ongoing studies of Soviet (and now Russian) military exports, are still the only official sources of this kind of information available to journalists and specialists.

Disarmament Race and Arms Race

According to SIPRI data, the Soviet Union was one of the world's leading arms exporters from 1981 to 1991—it sold arms worth \$121 billion. There are 54 countries on the list of the main recipients of arms from the USSR, and 44 of these are developing countries.

Total arms exports from the USSR in 1990 amounted to \$6.397 billion (in 1985 constant prices). In addition to conducting arms exports on a broad scale, the Soviet Union also bought weapons abroad in 1990-1991: for example, from Czechoslovakia (\$259 million worth) and from Poland (92 million).

It is also significant that total world expenditures on arms production in 1990-1991 amounted to \$950 billion, with the USSR and United States accounting for 60 percent of the total. As for arms exports, the same USSR and United States accounted for 69 percent of the total during this period, with the sole difference that America (40 percent) has overtaken us (29 percent) because of the sharp cuts in military shipments from the USSR to Afghanistan, Iraq, and India.

The EC countries are responsible for 21 percent of world arms exports (with France, England, and the FRG accounting for 90 percent of this total), and the largest importer of arms in 1990-1991 was Saudi Arabia.

Who Our Customers Are and What We Sell Them

General data on arms exports from the USSR (in 1985 constant prices) are presented in a table NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA received from SIPRI. These data indicate that shipments of arms from the USSR to some states (Nicaragua, Iran, Cuba, and India) had already been reduced substantially or had stopped completely by last year.

Table 1. Arms and Materiel Purchases (Excluding Spare Parts) of Foreign States From USSR in 1990 (in millions of dollars)*

Country	1990	1981-1990
Bulgaria	296	4,620
Hungary	0	3,629
Cuba	280	3,490
Yugoslavia	14	2,831
Vietnam	0 (88-90)	2,453
Algeria	0	1,899
Ethiopia	36	1,016
Nicaragua	50	779
Finland	32	652

Peru	71	593
Iran	420	434
Mozambique	0	0 (87-90)
Cambodia	41	—(N/A)
Kuwait	0	262
Mali	20	102
China	60	67
Papua New Guinea	13	13
India	1,233	18,534
Iraq	27	13,665
Syria	0	12,636
Czechoslovakia	422	10,089
Poland	330	6,663
Afghanistan	1,087	6,608
Angola	501	6,251
DPRK	516	6,139
Libya	0	6,093

* The figures presented in this table are probably estimates. Some seem debatable to us, particularly the "0" (zero) in the column for purchases of Soviet weapons by Syria and Mozambique. As Deputy Chairman I. Belousov of the USSR Council of Ministers announced at the beginning of 1991, these two countries were among the main recipients of Soviet arms in 1990 along with the PDRY, Cuba, Ethiopia, Algeria, and Afghanistan. The editors felt it would be useful to publish the SIPRI data, however, because our agencies do not even report the official figures of Soviet (or Russian) arms exports.

The main directions of Soviet military exports, however, can be seen quite clearly even from this small table. The main recipient of arms from the USSR—and now from Russia and possibly (?) from Kazakhstan—is India. The production of fighter planes, tanks, armored personnel carriers and, according to some sources, tactical missiles, ammunition, and spare parts on Soviet military licenses has been organized in this country.

Now India is experiencing a serious shortage or total lack of spare parts for Soviet-produced equipment, including military surface ships and leased submarines, and the MiG-21 and MiG-23 planes produced in India itself. This Asian country has displayed an interest in buying MiG-29 fighters and military helicopters.

Russia inherited many contracts for arms shipments to Iran from the former Soviet Union (for a total of around \$3.5 billion, according to some estimates). The shipments began at the end of 1989, after Iranian President Hashemi-Rafsanjani visited Moscow. Contracts envisage the sale of, for example, MiG-29 and Su-24 planes, T-72 tanks, and submarines of the class known as "Kilo" in the West. Iran has also expressed a desire to buy artillery weapons, armored personnel carriers, and infantry combat vehicles from Russia.

Russia revived military contacts with China and began making a vigorous effort to expand them. Soviet military cooperation with the PRC began tapering off under the influence of ideological disagreements in 1959, and

within a year it had reached a virtual standstill and all Soviet military specialists had been recalled from China. Our military contacts with the PRC began to be revived in 1990, and an agreement was signed on cooperation in the arms sphere. China would like to start by modernizing its Air Force with Russia's help (expertise and specialists). Beijing turned to Moscow for help because the West is in no hurry to give China this kind of assistance.

The Middle East is still a potentially promising region for Russia, according to SIPRI Professor Saadet Deter (Turkey). Although the conflict in the Persian Gulf demonstrated the ineffectiveness of several obsolete types of Soviet weapons, some countries in the region (Syria and Iraq, as well as Libya) will nevertheless have to buy spare parts for these weapons from Russia soon. In addition, the Persian Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia, which is trying to diversify its military exports, might want to buy the latest types of weapons from Russia. The resumption of active military cooperation between Russia and Kuwait is also possible.

Latin America has virtually lost its importance to Russia as a market for exported arms. The main recipient of arms from the USSR, Cuba, does not have the money to pay for new deliveries or to buy spare parts for the weapons it already has. Another of the leading recipients of Soviet military aid on that continent, Peru, has also sunk far into debt. Few people here know that Peru has been buying large quantities of combat helicopters, Su and MiG fighter-bombers, and other arms from the USSR since 1963. In addition, Peru had a whole network of aircraft enterprises for the repair of Soviet planes, where our military specialists and advisers worked.

New potential arms markets are also opening up for Russia. According to SIPRI Professor Ian Anthony (Great Britain), Russian weapons have already been offered for sale to Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines. A country like Indonesia, with a well-developed military industry of its own, would be capable in principle of cooperating with Russia in arms production.

Russia's military cooperation in arms production and deliveries with its former allies in the former Warsaw Pact is still going on. There have been sharp production cuts, however, at East European military enterprises manufacturing weapons on Soviet licenses. In an attempt to get rid of the "surplus" weapons they already have, Czechoslovakia shipped 300 T-72 tanks to Syria and Poland sent armored personnel carriers to Libya. These countries are "relieving themselves" of earlier Soviet military shipments by sending the weapons back to Russia in payment for these shipments.

Russia has also continued its military cooperation with Finland. Now Finland and Sweden want to join the EC, however, and they are more likely to buy weapons from NATO countries than from Russia. Russia's only options are to sell the Scandinavians the latest models of weapons or to offer them arms on the best possible

terms. Incidentally, in search of information about the possibility of sales of Russian weapons to the Scandinavian states, SIPRI addressed several questions to the military attache in the Russian Embassy in Stockholm but never received a single reply.

The Collapse of the Union and the Prospects for Arms Exports and Production in Its Former Republics

According to leading SIPRI experts, weapons production declined substantially in the CIS republics after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, more than 40 billion rubles has already been allocated for purchases of arms from CIS enterprises.

Despite the reduction of military requisitions, enterprises of the military-industrial complex in the republics of the former USSR are waging a quite successful struggle for their survival. Russia, for example, allocated 3.3 billion rubles in compensation for jobs lost as a result of the closure of enterprises of the military-industrial complex. Sales of the products of military plants in Russia and in Ukraine, however, are gradually escaping the control of government agencies. The foreign buyer is now able to deal with the ministry or with the immediate producer of weapons, and this creates opportunities for illegal sales.

According to SIPRI Professor Herbert Wolf (FRG), it will be difficult for enterprises of the military-industrial complex to sell whole items abroad without authorization from officials in Moscow, Kiev, or Alma-Ata, but unauthorized shipments of spare parts or dual-purpose items will be possible. The CIS republics will also want to find foreign buyers for their "surplus" weapons and military hardware made available by the reduction of the army.

The possibility that military specialists from the CIS republics will go to third countries is the cause of some anxiety in the West. For many years, for example, Yugoslavia was the main arms producer in the "developing world" (followed by Taiwan, Brazil, and South Africa). It is completely possible that these countries might invite not only our military scientists to their countries, but also our civilian specialists who are now employed in the military-industrial complex. By the same token, Russian and Ukrainian specialists from the defense industry could go after the "big bucks" in the United States, where they will probably have opportunities for "creative development" and high salaries.

People in the West are also worried about the massive arms reductions in the CIS republics. These reductions can be effected either through destruction or through export. There has been no real conversion of the defense industry in Russia or Ukraine yet, and the growth of military exports from the CIS states in the near future is therefore possible. Just recently, for example, MiG-29 fighters were offered for sale to Switzerland, but it ultimately bought planes from the Americans because it was afraid that political upheavals in our country might preclude the fulfillment of delivery commitments.

According to SIPRI data, Russia has recently been active in international arms fairs and exhibits in the Middle East, Europe, and Asia, in the hope of putting its "second cash crop" (after oil) on the international market "legally."

The reduction of military exports as a result of the UN sanctions against Iraq and the bankruptcy of the former main buyers of weapons (Mozambique, Cuba, Afghanistan, and Ethiopia—incidentally, the latter never paid for arms from the USSR anyway) forced Russia to seek new sales markets and establish new ties and contacts, according to SIPRI Director Adam Rotvold (Poland). Besides this, the dramatic deterioration of economic conditions and the disastrous shortage of hard currency are turning arms exports into one of the main areas of Russia's foreign economic activity.

In any case, according to SIPRI experts, the CIS republics (especially Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan) will try to augment their military exports on the centralized, state level and through direct shipments of weapons from the manufacturing enterprises to foreign clients in the near future.

Western Experts View Arms Trade

LD0804212992 Moscow *ITAR-TASS* in English
0802 GMT 8 Apr 92

[By *ITAR-TASS* correspondent Vyacheslav Bantin]

[Text] Tokyo April 8 TASS—"The G-7 nations have decided to study the CIS system for controlling the export of arms and strategic materials from the Commonwealth. Plans are afoot to send an international expert commission to several CIS countries for this purpose this May. It is to investigate the situation, pertaining to arms trade in the former USSR, and to draw up proposals to toughen controls over it," the Japanese newspaper "NIHON KEIZAI" reports today without revealing the source of this information.

According to the newspaper, a delegation of Western experts is expected to be sent primarily to Russia and Ukraine. It will include representatives from eight Western countries, including Japan and the United States.

Besides studying the system of control over arms deliveries abroad from the former Soviet republics, these experts will also share information with CIS colleagues on the organization of such controls in their respective countries. Eventually, G-7 countries may invite experts from several CIS republics for advanced training in order to enhance their professional standards and, thereby, improve the control system now operating in the former USSR.

"Such measures," the newspaper notes, "are intended, specifically, to help prevent new local conflicts in the developing countries, a matter that disturbs the West very much today."

Defense Cutbacks Prompt Increase

OW0204194292 Moscow *INTERFAX* in English
1852 GMT 2 Apr 92

[From the 3 April "Business Report"; transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Decreased financing for weapons purchases has meant that enterprises in the military-industrial complex have had to cut back development of many new military systems and weapon models. As of early 1992, aviation factories in Russia, Byelarus, and Ukraine have completely cancelled construction of long-range Tu-160 Blackjack bombers (NATO classification).

Military sources have been reporting that the approximately 20 unfinished bombers may be prepared for sale to third countries which are interested in purchasing Soviet military technology. India has been named as one potential importer, and Russia will allocate that country export credits for the purchase of Kolo-class diesel submarines (NATO classification).

Early this year the ship-building industry of the former Soviet Union stopped construction and modernization of Yankee-class submarines armed with nuclear missiles. Of the four types of submarine-based ICBMs, Russia's aviation-missile industry will develop only the SS-N-20, which has a 20-billion-ruble modernization program scheduled for completion within four years. During that time strategic missiles SS-11 and SS-17 will gradually be removed from military duty.

Of all the submarines in the CIS Navy, only the Typhoon-class strategic missile cruiser with 20 SS-N-20 onboard missiles and the Delta 5-type submarine will continue to be developed, with a modernization and rearmament program valued at 12-15 billion rubles in 1991 prices.

Possible Arms Sales to Iran Considered

92UN1077A Kiev *MOLOD UKRAYINY* in Ukrainian
13 Mar 92 pp 1-2

[Article by O. Strekal under the "View" rubric: "If Ukrainian Arms End Up in the Near East..."]

[Text] Presently this is only a possibility. But it has a chance of becoming reality as early as this summer.

Discussion about trade in arms of the former Soviet Army by countries of the CIS has been going on for a long time with various emphases. The West in particular is troubled by the sale of nuclear arms or their components beyond the boundaries of the Commonwealth and the departure of nuclear specialists to "third countries." Inside the former USSR it has become acceptable to use the "trade" argument in political disputes: Ukraine, for example, needs to seize the Black Sea Fleet, and afterward it will be profitable to sell it in pieces....

But the discussions are abating, the problems of nuclear warheads and military ships are gradually being decided, and the world is returning to a previous, "USSR" reality: The successors of the empire do not in principle reject the large profits from the sale of excess arms.

New concerns will appear when desires "in general" begin to become more specific and the threat arises of a change in the balance of power in this or that region of the planet.

This assumption is confirmed by our own domestic, "Ukrainian" example. In fact: Settlements in arms for Iranian petroleum and natural gas.

The subject of the military portion of the infamous supercontract was sounded during the very first visit of the Ukrainian delegation to Teheran. In a confidential conversation with Iranian representatives, Kostyantyn Masyk, first vice prime minister, "began improvising" and proposed that an essentially military barter exchange be examined.

True, none of the high state officials involved with the contract directly confirmed this information received from reliable sources in the Cabinet of Ministers. But nor did they categorically dispute it. And consultations in the Ministry of Conversion, Defense, and Foreign Affairs have demonstrated that the possibility of deliveries of Ukrainian arms to the Near East is very high. One may already speak about specific outlines: Negotiations in the summer of 1992, and sales at the beginning of 1993—if not sooner.

Below we will try to briefly answer the following three decisive questions connected with the subject of arms:

- Why will Ukraine sell spare parts, assault rifles, equipment, etc.?
- Why not sell them immediately?
- What political consequences will the "Iranian action" entail in the world?

Thus:

Why Will We Sell Arms?

If I were to sum up the arguments in favor of such trade I have received from high officials, the answer would be as follows.

Ukraine has not taken upon itself an obligation to halt trade in conventional types of weapons. It rejects unambiguously only the sale of nuclear arms and their components. As an independent state on a par with other countries, it has a full right to carry out its own policies in the sector of military exports as well.

The arms business is one of the most profitable in the world. Ukraine, which has a limited circle of "peaceful" export commodities, is compelled to sharply increase its hard-currency receipts at the same time. The main source for such receipts is arms and surpluses in them.

The Ukrainian military-industrial complex is falling apart, state orders are not coming in, hundreds of thousands of people are being left without work, and the process of conversion, which is not supported from without, is slowly dying away. Under such conditions, in the words of one of the ministers, the military-industrial complex is prepared to sell whatever it can, including its soul to the devil.

Reviewing the basic strategic preconditions, let us focus on the "tactical Iranian" causes.

There are problems with energy resources in the CIS: Even as General Rutskoy is saying on television that he will "close off the valves" to the Ukrainians, fraternal Turkmenistan is carrying out this action on the actual pipelines. Thus purchasing Iranian oil is a forced but also vitally important step for the republic.

But there is nothing with which to pay for it, even in barter. Arms would fill this gap very successfully.

There is also a purely subjective factor: Ukrainian officials are eager to adopt this plan and talk about the irreversibility (tempering it with the words potential and hypothetical) of this very variant for implementing national interests.

Why Are We Not Trading in Arms Now?

At the Ministry of Defense we were told what is apparently the main reason. Inasmuch as the Supreme Soviet has not approved a concept for the structure of a Ukrainian Armed Forces, it is too soon to talk about which kinds of arms may be sold abroad and which we will use ourselves. To undertake trade without the concept would mean neglecting the interests of the national security of the state.

Nor has there yet arisen an economic need for such barter. Deliveries of resources from Iran this year are miserly—4 million tonnes of petroleum and 3 billion cubic meters of natural gas. Ukraine is able to pay for them with civilian production—pipes, cement, etc.

Another obstruction has been the need to more seriously work out questions and some conflicts in the positions of the parties: Iran has proposed prices for our arms and spare parts for military equipment that are two or three times lower than world prices.

Of course, not much time is needed to overcome these obstacles. Viktor Antonov, minister of conversion, expressed the assumption that arms could be sent to Iran as early as 1993.

How Will the World Respond?

The political forecasts of official analysts are almost unanimous. Which is alarming by itself. Negative consequences are foreseen only in one instance: If Ukraine violates the instructions of the UN Security Council and begins to cooperate with countries upon which the Security Council has imposed sanctions, such as Iraq.

A possible official condemnation on the part of the United States would also be largely ignored. They say that Ukraine is a sovereign state and no one has the right to bind it with his "recommendations." Especially when America trades in arms with whomever it wants.

The conjecture that Iran may become an intermediary in the resale of the commodity to a "third person" is also considered unrealistic.

It may also be said that the Near East does not lose anything by Ukraine refusing to trade inasmuch as military supply clearly exceeds demand.

But we will not limit ourselves to these positive predictions, which also function as justifications. After all, the situation is not as unambiguous and secure as that. Confirmation of this is the opinion of Olena Koppel, associate professor of the Ukrainian institute of international relations:

"The traffic in arms from Ukraine to the Near East will, undoubtedly, violate the balance of power in the region of the Persian Gulf and may give rise to dissatisfaction in Kuwait, which is important to Ukraine these days on the level of trade cooperation."

It will also influence relations with Egypt negatively. That state is a participant in the Damascus Declaration on Joint Defense of the Persian Gulf. This means it has a certain stake with regard to infusions of arms into the region.

Our number one partner in the Near East is Israel. It has fairly difficult relations with Iran. Formally Teheran and Tel Aviv are opponents; after all, after the first round of the latest Arab-Israeli negotiations Iran was the initiator of the creation of a front to counteract Israel. At present it is supporting various terrorist anti-Israeli groups. Thus there is no doubt that Israel will not support a Ukrainian policy of arms sales.

Via Iran, of course, the arms will not end up in the hands of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). But they can easily be obtained by organizations that belong to the PLO or that have split from it: The National Front for the Liberation of Palestine (NFLP), the Democratic Front for Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), etc. These groups condemn the idea of peaceful negotiations with Israel and rely on a military solution to problems in the Near East.

With regard to the position of the United States, each year Congress approves a list of states to which sales of American arms is permitted. Iran is not on these lists. Furthermore, the United States and Israel carry out a coordinated policy in the Near East. Thus it is possible with a fair amount of reliability to talk about the negative attitude of official Washington toward Ukrainian-Israeli military contacts.

We will add that possible accusations that Ukraine is supporting terrorism would not be so groundless and would be capable of complicating relations with the world community.

There is also the following interesting facet. A contract between the countries would most likely cause the activation of foreign military intelligence, especially of the Israeli Mossad, whose potential capabilities on the territory of the former USSR are already significant. This also means the collection of many related secrets and the bribery of bureaucrats. According to unverified data, after Masyk's trip to Teheran there appeared in Kiev the first seekers of working documents of the contract.

From this it follows that a contract with Iran may result in the first serious test of Ukrainian foreign policy. Iranian petroleum, while resolving our domestic problems, is capable of serving as a detonator for foreign problems. Then it would be good to grasp the difference between state interests and state egoism.

Nuclear Industry Tests Chinese Market

*LD2303200392 Moscow TASS in English 1921 GMT
23 Mar 92*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Andrey Kirillov]

[Text] Beijing March 23 TASS—The Russian section turned out to be one of the most popular at an international exhibition of the nuclear industry, drawing to a close in Beijing today.

Chinese specialists were especially interested in the over-1000 reactor for 1,000 megawatts and the act-500 nuclear heating station, Nikolay Babaev, scientific secretary of the Russian Atomic Energy Ministry, told ITAR TASS. "These are our two best exhibits", Babaev explained.

The Chinese took an interest in all aspects of peaceful use of the atom—from production of fuel for nuclear power stations to burying radioactive wastes, he said. The Russian side also offered China unique technology to increase the life of nuclear power stations from 30 years to 50.

Last December China commissioned its first nuclear power station and is now constructing two more. The Chinese prefer barter deals—to exchange equipment for consumer goods and are also prepared to pay hard currency, Babaev said.

Some of the proposals were rather exotic, he added. At one instance, the Chinese offered to swap Russian nuclear technology for a Chinese restaurant, they offered to open in any Russian city, promising to supply food directly from Beijing.

They were seriously interested in returning to Dubna after thirty-odd years to the well-known center of nuclear research. The Chinese, in turn, offered to share their experience in converting nuclear industry to civilian

uses. In China, half of the nuclear industry is working for civilian purposes, earning profits. A large delegation of nuclear experts is now visiting China to discuss nuclear issues.

Militia Foils Attempt To Sell 'Red Mercury'

LD0904170392 Moscow *ITAR-TASS World Service*
in Russian 1530 GMT 9 Apr 92

[By CRIME-PRESS correspondent for TASS]

[Text] Tambov (Central Russia), 9 Apr—An attempt to take 180 kg of "red mercury"—the strategic metal used in the production of nuclear weapons—out of the country has been foiled by the efforts of the Russian and Ukrainian militias.

Militia Colonel Vladimir Puchnin, chief of the internal affairs directorate of Tambov Oblast (Central Russia), today told a CRIME-PRESS correspondent that workers at the Tambov plant where "red mercury" is produced were among the plunderers. Fortunately, the cargo, which was seized in Poltava (Ukraine), has been returned to the enterprise.

Radioactive Mercury Stolen From Belarus

LD2003061492 Moscow *Russian Television*
Network in Russian 2000 GMT 19 Mar 92

[From the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] Some 2,000 kg of spent mercury have been stolen from a metallurgical combine in Novokuznetsk. Two lead containers with radioactive substances have been stolen from the Belaruskaliy factory. It is not reported here, but their radiation level is known: 20 roentgens per hour. That means the thieves may not live to appear in court.

Threat of Nuclear Theft Termed 'Very Real'

LD0504180992 Moscow *POSTFACTUM* in English
1337 GMT 5 Mar 92

[From the "Politics" section]

[Text] Vladivostok—Military experts from Russia's Far Eastern Military District believe the danger of nuclear weapons being stolen in their district is very real indeed. Experts tend to believe that this situation is due to the district having only 50 percent of the privates it needs, and also due to a complete lack of discipline and law and order.

As one high-ranking officer on the Far Eastern District's staff told PF [POSTFACTUM] on April 3, a special Nuclear Arms Inventory Commission, to be sent by the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Commonwealth Armed Forces, will be working in the Far Eastern District in mid April. PF military analysts link this prospect not only to the formation of the Russian Army, which the Far Eastern Military District—the CIS's largest land-based

armed formation, equipped with nuclear arms—automatically becomes part of, but also to the growing incidence of large-scale theft of conventional arms committed by servicemen.

Ex-Officer Reportedly Sold Missile Secrets

PM1903133992 Moscow *KOMSOMOLSKAYA*
PRAVDA in Russian 19 Mar 92 p 1

[ITAR-TASS report: "Why We Make Missiles. How Dealer Shmulevich Met With Former Soviet Army Officer and Left Inspired"]

[Text] A former Soviet Army officer has attempted to sell secret documents to an Israeli private detective on a mission to Zurich. This was reported by the Israeli weekly HA'OLAM HAZE.

This incident, if the magazine is to be believed, occurred about two months ago. In Zurich the Israeli private detective Yakov Shmulevich [name as transliterated] was approached by an intermediary who offered to introduce him to an "interesting man." This man turned out to be a former Soviet Army officer who had found unusual goods for a customer. "He said that he had boxes of documents and blueprints of secret weapons which could be of interest to the West," Shmulevich said. "I realized that what was on offer was material smuggled out of the USSR." The "dealer in secrets" priced all the documents at \$5,000. According to the weekly, the detective did not know what to do, since he was no expert on military hardware and did not speak Russian—the language of the documents. As a result he agreed to take a few pages as a specimen.

Analysis of the documents showed that they related to an 8,100-kg Soviet cruise missile. "The journalists turned to specialists who concluded that we were talking about really secret information although, clearly, not unique information from the intelligence standpoint." In confirmation of the story the weekly featured a picture of the blueprint, under which the Russian words "Plan of Launcher" can be read.

HA'OLAM HAZE does not say what happened next—whether the "dealer" managed to sell his goods to Israeli intelligence or whether he was left empty-handed. In conclusion the weekly states: "Like other citizens of the former USSR, Soviet officers are coming to the West in search of 'greenbacks.' Consequently, in Antwerp, Geneva, and other European cities you can meet people dealing in military documents. Just 10 years ago the Western secret services would have paid a fortune for such information. But today it can be had at knockdown prices virtually on the streets."

Academician Discounts Danger of 'Brain Drain'

92WP0204A Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English
No 7, 16-23 Feb 92 p 9

[Interview with Kurchatov Institute First Deputy Director Nikolay Ponomarev-Stepnoy by Dmitriy Yakushin: "Nuclear 'Time Trouble'"]

[Text] The West continues to express grave concern about the possible fate of the ex-USSR nuclear scientists whose expertise could be of use to certain Third World countries. Academician Nikolai Ponomarev-Stepnoi First Deputy Director of the Kurchatov Institution Russian Scientific Centre, said, when speaking to an MN correspondent, that he sees only one way to avoid that contingency.

How many experts in your Kurchatov Institution have direct access to nuclear technologies?

Among our staff of 10,000, about 2,500 are involved in scientific studies proper. Approximately 10 percent of the latter are the key people who are able to design the dreaded thing.

How many such people are there in the country?

There are several thousand of them, as far as I know.

The press reported the advances made by Libyans to certain people from Kurchatov Institutions.

Indeed, there have been proposals from Libya, but of a different nature. It is no secret that we built a peaceful research nuclear centre in Tagiura, Libya. So our experts have been invited there as research consultants. There are several of our men there now. In the past, there were sometimes almost as many as a hundred of them there.

But such peaceful centres are believed to be potentially convertible to military purposes.

We know what is actually happening in the Tagiura centre. I guarantee the absence of any military-oriented work there now. Aware of the danger involved, we excluded everything which could be used as a technological basis for military-oriented work from the design of the centre.

Are you concerned about the possibility of nuclear brain drain from the ex-USSR?

I do not believe there will be a massive brain drain. A few people will emigrate, presumably. But then again, people even emigrated under the previous stricter and more closed system. Perhaps, the industry in question, i.e., the development of nuclear technologies, is unique for its employees: because of love for their profession, people agree to live in a closed city and accept the psychological stress involved. The compensation is loving their work. It is hard for them to change their opinions and they would do this least of all for money.

Can the situation change in future?

Our nuclear experts will not seek to emigrate so long as we provide them with work. But if we take their work from them, they will be indeed tempted to emigrate, since they are not likely to be able to find work elsewhere in the country, being experts in a very specific field. But then they would go West. After all, as scientists, they are on par with their American colleagues. I hardly believe they would opt for Libya, with its peculiar living conditions and thus risk losing an opportunity to go to the West in the future.

Consequently, the solution is in continuation of work. But can it be continued under the conditions of shrinking military research and dwindling financial support for science?

I rather doubt that subsidies from the state budget alone can keep the nuclear experts occupied. At best, the money allocated will go to raise the staff's salaries, but salaries are not the crucial factor here, as I said. That will not be enough to keep the people in. The only way out of the impasse is joint projects with U.S. involvement. In certain areas, we possess state of the art technologies. And in some areas we are the best. We can not put our ideas into practice, however. In the meantime, there is demand for programmes ensuring better safety at nuclear installations, providing more powerful energy sources for space vehicles, and creating global antimissile system, to name just a few directions. Development of such programmes would cost less if our experts get involved in it. But, the plan of paying our nuclear experts from special funds (which are expected to be raised) is not going to solve the issue.

Russian Parliamentarians Visit Arzamas-16

LD1803235892 Moscow Teleradiokompaniya
Ostankino Television First Program Network
in Russian 2120 GMT 18 Mar 92

[Interview with A. Ye. Yeremin, chairman of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet committee for industry and power generation by correspondent A. Tsiurlnikov; from the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] [Announcer] Nuclear weapons specialists at the Russian nuclear center known as Arzamas-16 consider that the dismantling and destruction of nuclear weapons can take place only at the enterprises where they were assembled and only under the supervision of the people who actually designed them.

[A. Tsiurlnikov] High-ranking guests began arriving in Arzamas-16 recently. Nevertheless, this remains a closed town. The Russian Supreme Soviet is currently considering what special status should govern the existence of this and other such towns. It was with this in mind that members of the Russian Federation's Supreme Soviet Presidium and leaders of Supreme Soviet committees visited [words indistinct] the country's federal center for nuclear physics.

A dilemma is emerging from the overall issue in hand: Is the town part of the Russian atomic center, or is the center a part of the town?

[Begin A. Ye. Yereimin recording] If you think about it, there are special demands that have to be made regarding industrial production, perimeter security, and creation of the required conditions of secrecy. And also creation of the conditions required to maintain the scientific potential of this town. [end recording]

Nuclear Disarmament, Destruction Issues Viewed

Belarus To Remain 'Nuclear Free'

LD0404110192 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service
in Russian 1650 GMT 3 Apr 92

[By BELTA-TASS correspondent Larisa Lazar]

[Text] Minsk, 3 Apr (TASS)—Weapons of mass destruction—nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons—must be banned in the civilized world. This is the gist of the dialogue that took place between Stanislav Shushkevich, chairman of the Belarus Supreme Soviet, and chairmen of the committee of the international movement "Medics of the World Against Nuclear War".

Stanislav Shushkevich noted that Belarus is taking necessary measures to become a nuclear free state. By 1 July it is planned to complete the withdrawal of tactical weapons from the republic and to place under international control the withdrawal of strategic weapons. "It is only now that we understand how difficult it is to carry out disarmament but there will be no backing down in this respect", said the head of the Belarusian parliament.

Doctor Bernard Laun, head of the delegation, appealed to the leader of the Belarusian State urging him to support the medics in their fight to halt nuclear tests. He noted the need for the world community to monitor nuclear arms stationed in the CIS countries. "The cold war" has ended but we must fight together for outlawing nuclear weapons. In this connection, Belarus has unique opportunities, Bernard Laun said.

To Start Civilian Production

PM2703083492 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 25 Mar 92 p 3

[Untitled report from own information, ITAR-TASS roundup under the general heading "Panorama of Foreign Military News"]

[Text] Belarussian Supreme Soviet Chairman S. Shushkevich emphasized in an interview with the Finnish newspaper HELSINGIN SANOMAT that the republic is planning to transfer military plants to civilian production, and is interested in developing cooperation in this sector with Finnish firms. He absolutely refuted all pronouncements about the retention of nuclear weapons on Belarussian territory, stating that the "Finnish model

is more attractive than the position of a great power, based on the possession of nuclear weapons."

Ukraine Confirms Nonproliferation

LD0904183292 Kiev UKRINFORM Diplomatic
Information Service in Russian 1723 GMT 9 Apr 92

[By UKRINFORM correspondent Aleksandr Litvinov]

[Text] Kiev, 9 Apr—Ukraine has confirmed its intention to join the 1968 Agreement on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, says the resolution adopted today by the Supreme Soviet of the republic.

However, bearing in mind that the Russian Government and the command of the CIS strategic forces have not created the system of implementing effective technical control over nonuse of the nuclear weapons stationed on the territory of Ukraine which (the system) was envisaged by the agreement of 21 December 1991 and also taking into consideration Ukraine's high responsibility over the destruction and nonuse of components of nuclear warheads and the ban on their export, the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet has resolved to consider inexpedient the removal of tactical nuclear weapons from the territory of Ukraine until the mechanism for international control over its destruction with Ukraine's participation has been developed and implemented.

The Cabinet of Ministers has been instructed to take corresponding measures immediately to provide effective technical control on the part of Ukraine over nonuse of the nuclear weapons stationed on its territory. It has been recommended to the president of Ukraine to start negotiations with leaders of the nuclear states regarding the complex solving of problems to do with the liquidation of nuclear weapons. The Ukrainian Defense Ministry must take measures to re-man the strategic forces, stationed on the territory of Ukraine, with servicemen from the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

Missile Destruction Center Viewed

LD0204182492 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1724 GMT 2 Apr 92

[By UKRINFORM correspondent Aleksandr Litvinov]

[Text] Kiev April 2 TASS—The Prime Minister of Ukraine, Vitold Fokin, is meeting today in Kiev with the recently arrived American delegation and discussing with it the creation of a special scientific centre and a factory for missile destruction, Ukraine's President Leonid Kravchuk said in a meeting with his representatives in provinces, who supported return to Ukraine of nuclear filling of strategic weapons after their "dismemberment" in Russia. According to them, this filling could be used as nuclear fuel in atomic reactors.

On the whole, this meeting was devoted to discussions of a draft statute on local state administration, which the

president's representatives in provinces treated critically, recommended to recast it, keeping into consideration proposals and remarks, and to put it before the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet for its consideration.

Some speakers also spoke about the necessity of submission of the Ministry of the Interior and national security service bodies to the president's representative, clarifying the situation on the border with Moldova, and the necessity of compulsory fulfillment of interregional supplies.

Commentary on Transfers to Russia

*LD0904091592 Moscow Radio Moscow in Czech
1700 GMT 4 Apr 92*

[Commentary by station military observer Vadim Solovyev; Solovyev in Russian fading into Czech report]

[Text] Statements made by some members of the Ukrainian parliament to the effect that a section of nuclear arms should remain in the republic have caused certain concern in European countries. Is this at all possible? Listen to what Vadim Solovyev, our military observer, has to say in reply to this question.

[Solovyev] The nuclear arms issue was clarified quite simply at the beginning of the establishment of the CIS. The establishment of the Commonwealth must not lead to the proliferation of nuclear powers in the world. Leading representatives of the states on which nuclear arsenals of the former Soviet Union remain agreed that Russia would inherit all nuclear weapons and the nuclear button in the interest of all, and after an agreement with the whole Commonwealth. Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan pledged themselves to accede to the treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, to ratify the treaty on the reduction of strategic offensive weapons signed by the United States and the former Soviet Union in 1991, and to hand the treaty over to the archives of the Russian parliament. It was agreed that the Commonwealth countries would jointly supervise the withdrawal of nuclear weapons to Russia and their liquidation.

These are merely some provisions of the agreement concerning the nuclear weapons of the Soviet Union which was signed by leading representatives of the CIS at the meeting in Alma-Ata last December. In addition, the legislative bodies of Ukraine and Belarus declared the territory of their respective states nuclear-free and forbade for ever any deployment of nuclear weapons on their territories.

Yes, this is how it really is, our military observer continues. All of a sudden ideas have however appeared that Ukraine would gain much more if it stayed a nuclear power. The reason? Its international authority would increase and Russia would have to assess its relation with it differently. As a member of the military I doubt that it is possible to talk seriously about the existence of a nuclear potential in Ukraine. It is true, there are missiles there. What is however also necessary is command points, nuclear weapons guiding system, control of their

activity, manufacture and servicing, training the relevant military cadres, and training scientists and engineers—all this is a very heavy financial burden. Only an industrially advanced state, and indeed not everyone, can manage this. The maintenance of nuclear weapons will simply destroy the unbalanced Ukrainian economy.

I however believe that the main reason lies somewhere else—in acquiring and possibly earning revenue with the help of nuclear fission material contained in nuclear warheads. Listen to what General Sergey Zelentsov, deputy commander of the Chief Directorate of the CIS Armed Forces Command, has to say:

[Zelentsov in Russian fading into Czech report] Ukraine, in line with its obligation, must maintain uranium and plutonium [sentence as heard]. Trading with military-grade uranium and plutonium also must not be undertaken. International restrictions exist for states possessing nuclear arms. It is also inadmissible to sell military-grade nuclear materials to states which do not possess such kinds of weapons. Our units which possess nuclear arms refused to take the Ukrainian oath. Ukraine does not possess its own nuclear arms and has no access to them. Nuclear weapons are at present in units subordinated to the central power. We do not intend at all to transfer them to Ukraine. Perhaps we shall have to take extreme measures, but Ukraine will not get nuclear arms, says General Sergey Zelentsov, a representative of the CIS Armed Forces Command.

[Solovyev] Now the latest news on this subject, Vadim Solovyev, our military observer, continues. At a meeting in Brussels this week with the U.S. secretary of defense, Colonel General Pavel Grachev, Russia's first deputy minister of defense, assured him that all tactical weapons deployed on the territory of the former Soviet republics will be transferred to Russia by 1 July this year. This process will take place under the joint supervision of the CIS countries. The arms withdrawn will be liquidated, but before that they will be gathered at special bases in Russia. Changes in the timetable of the withdrawal of strategic nuclear devices and their concentration on the territory of Russia is also not envisaged. It will be completed in 1994 on the basis of the decision signed by leading representatives of CIS countries.

Ukrainian, Russian 'Differences' Eyed

*LD2503181392 Moscow Radio Moscow World
Service in English 0810 GMT 25 Mar 92*

[Commentary by Viktor Yenzikeyev]

[Text] Leaders of the Commonwealth of Independent States meeting in the Ukrainian capital Kiev last Friday [20 March] failed to resolve all of the defense issues on the summit agenda largely because of differences between Russia and Ukraine. Unsurprisingly, the question of control over the former Soviet Union's nuclear

stockpile dominated Monday's telephone conversation between Presidents Yeltsin and Bush. Commentary by Viktor Yenzikeyev:

The commander in chief of the Commonwealth forces, Air Marshal Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov told a correspondent for the Army daily KRASNAYA ZVEZDA that the dispute between Ukraine and Russia over the future of nuclear weapons was over, and he added that Kiev had reaffirmed its plan for the transfer of tactical weapons to Russia and that work was now in progress to prepare a paper providing both for their transfer and on-spot checks of operation to eliminate them.

Significantly, the Ukrainian defense minister, General Konstantin Morozov, also speaking on Monday and much in the same key, indicated the absence of any serious rift between Kiev and Moscow on the defense matters. He spoke of minor disagreements on separate issues which should cause no worries, giving reassurances that all of the nuclear weapons deployed in Ukraine were under protection. It is to be hoped high-ranking army officials know what they are talking about.

Speaking at the end of the Kiev summit the Russian president, Mr. Yeltsin, said he found the Ukrainian position to be positive and that Russia and Ukraine were almost unanimous on defense matters. But Ukrainian leader, Mr. Kravchuk, promptly stepped in saying it must have been a joke because Ukraine refrained from discussing military issues.

But all told, even after the summit, the Ukrainian leadership has had to allay Western fears over Mr. Kravchuk's stunning move to suspend the transfer of tactical nuclear weapons to Russia by July as agreed before. Kazakhstan's decision to take charge of nuclear weapons in its territory has also made a few eyebrows raise in the West.

Mr. Yeltsin and Mr. Kravchuk are far from being chums. Nor do other CIS leaders have any experience in making compromise at the negotiating table, particularly on sensitive issues. But there should be no doubt that CIS countries are peace minded. Both Ukraine and Kazakhstan have repeatedly spoken of wanting to be nuclear free, stressing the resolve to help toward a disarmament process in Europe and worldwide. One main reason is that they have no other option. For its own part, Russia has also reaffirmed commitment to international arms control agreements, both conventional and nuclear, and Mr. Yeltsin's latest proposals appear to be more far reaching than those of Mr. Bush.

Difficulties are inevitable and many of the problems caused by the break up of the Soviet Union and the emergence of the Commonwealth of Independent States can be explained because of the sheer size of the country involved. Compromise is struck in the end, albeit with difficulty. It is perhaps for this reason that Mr. Bush, calling Chancellor Kohl of Germany soon after the Kiev

summit, has hastened to assure him that the CIS countries, would resolve differences on military matters in an amicable way.

Concern Over Disarmament Continues

PM0804163192 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 4 Apr 92 First Edition p 6

[Vladimir Gubarev article under the rubric "View of A Problem": "Sober Calculation or Nuclear Madness?"]

[Text] Arzamas-16—The atom bomb has become a superstar. It is constantly talked about on television and written about by journalists and has its merits and drawbacks discussed by politicians. There is simply no counting the number of "nuclear disarmament experts," each promoting his own action program which immediately begins to be discussed—and, unfortunately, sometimes to be implemented as well.

It is still possible to understand the concern in the West over our nuclear weapons. The disintegration of the Soviet Union has led to a lowering of the safety threshold of the weapons, and however hard we try to convince the public that "everything is under control," this is not so. After all, hundreds of nuclear warheads are being moved from one state of the CIS to another, and this is already dangerous in itself.

A doctor of sciences who creates nuclear weapons in Arzamas-16 earns a monthly salary which is less than that earned by a cleaner in the White House, and twice as low as the official poverty line—this is also a reality. This is why there has been talk of a "brain drain" and the possibility of our nuclear scientists departing to "suspect" countries. In Germany enriched uranium is found in the trunk of an automobile; French television carries mysterious film featuring trade in nuclear charges, and already each of us is almost convinced: This is really what is happening!

Illusions about nuclear weapons are extraordinarily dangerous, but playing games around them can lead to catastrophe. Unfortunately, such games are being played at all levels.

USSR President M. Gorbachev launched a program for the total elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2000. The world applauded; commentators—incidentally, the same ones who criticize the president today—sang ecstatic panegyrics. New political and economic doctrines were created, and...no one asked the specialists: Can nuclear weapons really be destroyed by the year 2000, and can this be done at all? Suddenly it became clear that this is impossible; there is simply not enough time, and besides, economically advantageous and efficient ways of reprocessing weapons-grade plutonium and uranium do not exist at present. I do not know whether M. Gorbachev was informed about the real situation, or whether he had ventured on this step for the

sake of political showmanship. I suspect that the president had the wrong consultants—to be more exact, nonprofessionals.

The Russian president has quickly ended up in a similar situation. It is difficult even to imagine who suggested to B.N. Yeltsin the, in my view, quite absurd idea of retargeting missiles away from U.S. cities. This was obviously an uninformed person, because a professional at once explained to me that if nuclear weapons were retargeted from U.S. cities onto, for example, U.S. missile bases, this would be clear proof that Russia was preparing to inflict a first strike against America, in other words, to start a war. "Targeting a city" is nothing other than the "doctrine of deterrence." We will not analyze its effectiveness—that requires a separate discussion—but it is just such a military strategy that we proclaimed. If the United States is removed altogether from our nuclear sights, then the natural question arises: Where will the missiles be targeted then? Into space? On the south? The east? There is no answer. At first sight, B. Yeltsin's statement sounded "striking," as some sections of the mass media wrote, but this kind of political impact only ever lasts a few days, and then charges of incompetence arise.

The presidents of the sovereign states are vying with one another to demonstrate their attitude to nuclear weapons, and, whether consciously or not, they want to retain the status of "nuclear president." With such an epithet your authority on the planet is somewhat higher. Lamentable though it may be, possession of nuclear weapons, irrespective of personal qualities, makes the leader of a state a "weightier" figure in international cooperation.

The haste of Ukraine and Byelarus in deciding on the status of "nuclear-free states" cannot fail to cause concern. Mention of the nuclear topic is naturally hateful to the peoples of these republics, which were scorched by Chernobyl, and by declaring that they would get rid of nuclear weapons, their leaders increased their prestige. It was announced that tactical nuclear weapons would be fully withdrawn to Russia by as early as the summer of this year. Just as in the old days, reports quickly appeared to the effect that the target would be fulfilled ahead of schedule! But, dear friends, why did you not explain that transporting weapons, removing them from combat standby, and putting them into storage are operations which brook no haste? Moreover, given the current state of the roads, regularly the scene of crashes, the transfer of a large number of nuclear weapons is dangerous.

Yes, a nuclear explosion can be ruled out even in the event of a train crash—the designers have demonstrated this—but nuclear weapons contain plutonium. The "leakage" of plutonium in an accident would mean a disaster no lesser than Chernobyl. So far things are all right—knock on wood—but why, for the sake of a dubious popularity and applause, make hasty decisions on which people's lives depend? You can make mistakes

with the economy, both tactical and strategic decisions are admissible—in the end the people, having suffered for a while, will correct them and punish you. But haste and mistakes where nuclear weapons are concerned are inadmissible: Here the question is of life and death.

Ukrainian President L. Kravchuk unexpectedly made the decision to suspend the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons. Possibly someone or other drew his attention to the fact that weapons-grade plutonium and uranium are perhaps the most "valuable commodity" in the modern world. A nuclear charge contains enormous intellectual and material assets which are far more valuable than gold or diamonds. The desire to keep these assets on Ukrainian territory can be understood. But the subsequent statement that an enterprise where nuclear charges could be dismantled should be created in Ukraine cannot help but put you on your guard—this is madness! Ukraine simply does not have the specialists able to do this, and, moreover, to create such an enterprise would require many billions of rubles, or karbo-vantsy, as the Ukrainians call them, and perhaps this can no longer be done today either in Ukraine or in Russia, in view of the manifest disintegration of the economy.

B. Yeltsin has visited Arzamas-16. He saw how unique the nuclear weapons complex is. The decision was made to set up federal nuclear centers in Arzamas-16 and Chelyabinsk-70. I will not conceal the fact that those who work in Arzamas-16 were encouraged by the Russian president's understanding of their needs. Many told me so, from leaders to rank-and-file specialists. But, unfortunately, the apparatus is in no great hurry to fulfill the decisions which were adopted—the centers are still not being financed, and there are only declarations of government aid.

But the West is in a hurry! There they understand perfectly well just what great material and intellectual assets are concentrated in Arzamas-16 and Chelyabinsk-70. The following incident took place in my presence. Humanitarian aid arrived in Arzamas-16 from Norway—baby food, wheelchairs, dried milk. This tonne of freight was accompanied by 26 people, including about 10 journalists. Thanks are due for the help, of course, but thanks are apparently not enough for the visitors. They wanted to become more closely acquainted with the nuclear center and its work and to talk to the creators of nuclear weapons.

Surely they do not think us quite so poverty-stricken as to be willing to share our nuclear secrets in return for a jar of baby food? The visitors from Norway were welcomed amicably: They were given food and drink and shown splendid kindergartens and churches, of which there are many in these parts. But all the same, an incident occurred during the presentation ceremony for the humanitarian aid—the journalists from Norway no longer concealed their true goals: They were indignant at not being allowed into the "industrial zone." I think they would not have permitted themselves to behave like that in nuclear centers in the United States, France, or

Britain. I have been in these places, and I know that the regime is roughly the same everywhere—nuclear secrets are nuclear secrets.

As is well known, glass beads were especially popular among the natives of Polynesia in the era of great geographical discoveries. It was possible to get gold and precious stones in exchange for them. Today, for bits of glass they are substituting "greenbacks." Dollars are an excellent bait to catch simpletons. The furor raised over "the brain drain and the leakage of nuclear technology and materials" in the world press is, in my view, aimed at such simpletons. Moreover, almost anyone who wants to be participating in this game, and the further they stand from the weapons complex, the more active they are. So far not only has not a single specialist involved in the creation of weapons disappeared anywhere, but none has any intention of so doing. There are very few of them, and their attitude is well known. And now, people who are a long way from Arzamas-16 and Chelyabinsk-70, who have never seen a nuclear bomb, even from a distance, try to sell themselves as dear as possible—will they suddenly be showered with "greenbacks"? And high ranks and famous institutions are being implicated. The proposal to dismantle a nuclear charge in Red Square or in the lobby of the "Olympiyskiy" [Hotel], with the participation of stars of stage and screen, which was hatched among physicists, testifies to the total ignorance of its initiators. However, the glitter of "greenbacks" is capable of clouding the reason even of people with a high scientific and political education...

The Pentagon has allocated \$400 million to our nuclear disarmament program. There has been public excitement over this sensational report for a good three months now. Naturally, the money was allocated in the form of specific products. In particular, it was proposed to deliver to Russia containers to store weapons-grade plutonium. But an extraordinary thing occurred: It turns out that they already have containers in Arzamas-16, more secure and sophisticated ones too. Americans are practical people and offered to buy the containers from us. And now it is difficult to comprehend who is helping whom. Perhaps the question should be put differently: Should we not be talking of joint work rather than aid?

Recently a prestigious U.S. delegation visited Arzamas-16. The correspondent of the institute house newspaper interviewed Siegfried Hecker, director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory. Asked about his most vivid impressions, the U.S. nuclear weapons specialist replied laconically: "I am amazed by the high level of your academics and specialists and by your experimental base. The enthusiasm and keenness of your staffers surprised me."

To this I will add just one thing: Our U.S. colleagues were shown only a small proportion of the wealth which our nuclear center possesses. There should be no doubt—in this field at present we are not behind the United States, and in some spheres we are ahead. The

Americans are incontestably ahead in some things, especially since they are continuing intensive tests in Nevada, while we have to all intents and purposes not been conducting tests for five years now.

Therefore true partnership lies in mutual cooperation, above all in ensuring the security of nuclear weapons. At least, for as long as they exist. But this is not a technical problem, but an exclusively political one.

At last \$25 million of the "homeless" \$400 million has, it seems, found a use. A. Kozyrev, J. Baker, and H.-D. Genscher have signed the "Trilateral Agreement" in Brussels. The idea is to set up an international scientific and technical center in Russia. The statement says, in particular: "An important goal of projects supported by the center would be to provide academics and specialists connected with weapons with opportunities to redirect their talents into nonmilitary projects, and especially to minimize any incentives to participate in activity which could lead to the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, or missile delivery systems. Through these projects academics and specialists would also assist efforts being made to reduce and eliminate weapons of mass destruction, including the elaboration of technologies capable of furthering such efforts. The center would also serve the wider goals of supporting the transition to a market economy responding to civil needs, supporting basic and applied research, and developing technology."

Various documents are appended to this statement. The gist of them is the same: A kind of controlling organ should be set up in Russia to finance the work of our scientists. Now here is the unfortunate part—their work is rated much too cheaply in "greenbacks." The United States is giving \$25 million, Europe and Japan the same. I will say simply for information purposes: In any laboratory at Arzamas-16 it is easy to find entirely specific research work which is "worth" more than this \$75 million.... In my view, an international center of this kind is not needed, since its activity is limited only to Russia and certain CIS countries. International cooperation envisages equality among its participants, the joint solution of various problems, and above all, trust in one another. This is not to be found in the documents signed in Brussels.

But it is not so difficult, I think, for the Russian Government to find funds for our two nuclear centers. Especially since the money is trifling in comparison with what is being spent today on discussing how to aid our nuclear scientists. We simply need to fulfill the president's decisions.

The Arzamas-16 and Chelyabinsk-70 nuclear centers are just as much a national asset of our motherland as the Hermitage or the Kremlin, the Space Center in the Moscow area, the cosmodrome in Plesetsk, "Uralmash," or the Norilsk combine. The people have paid a high price for their creation. To destroy them is easy, and this

is why emotional, hasty decisions are so dangerous. An instantaneous advantage could turn out to be a disaster in the not-so-distant future.

I sometimes hear from friends and colleagues: Why be a "blind hawk" and defend this Arzamas-16, where the most terrible weapons were created?! Of course, it is very easy, and in our times, even profitable to pose as a champion of disarmament, a real dove of peace. As the scientific observer of KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA and PRAVDA I had occasion to visit uranium mines, nuclear test sites, and nuclear centers, I have seen the horrors of the Chernobyl disaster with my own eyes, and I have met with hibakushi—survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki—so it is not just from hearsay that I know about nuclear apocalypse.... The fact that so many weapons have been amassed on our tiny planet can only be explained as nuclear madness—and this, unfortunately, is a reality. The path of disarmament, which today is not just a requirement, but a necessity, is extremely complex, however, and, unfortunately, long. Haste or games with the atom bomb must not be permitted.

France Willing To Help CIS Dismantle Weapons

LD2703232192 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service in English 1900 GMT 27 Mar 92

[Text] France is willing to aid Russia and the other nuclear republics on formerly Soviet territory in their attempts to dismantle their nuclear weapons. President Mitterrand has appointed the one time secretary of state on defense matters, Gerard Renon, the head of the French delegation that is to arrive in Moscow on the 29th of this month to discuss during the next three days the possible use of French technologies in the transformation of plutonium for its eventual use for civilian purposes.

EC Members Discuss Fate of USSR Weapons

Kolokolov Receives Envoys

LD0504203192 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1427 GMT 3 Apr 92

[Text] Moscow, 3 Apr (ITAR-TASS)—Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Boris Kolokolov today received the ambassadors of 12 EC member countries accredited to Moscow and also the head of the EC mission. According to the Russian Federation Foreign Ministry information department, there was a detailed conversation on military-political problems, including matters linked with the fate of the former USSR's nuclear weapons and implementation of the treaties on strategic offensive armaments and conventional armed forces in Europe. It was stressed on the Russian side that as the USSR's successor state Russia is ready to the maximum extent to ensure fulfilment of its obligations under these agreements and other accords concerning nuclear disarmament and conventional armaments. The ambassadors expressed concern over the future fate of the nuclear

potential on the territory of the former USSR and declared their countries' interest in reaching a prompt accord in this sphere and also on matters connected with the ratification and entry into force of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, in which CIS states are also participants.

Treaty Ratification Suspended

LD0304201792 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1730 GMT 3 Apr 92

[Text] Kolokov, Russian Federation deputy foreign minister, received the ambassadors of the 12 EC member states accredited to Moscow and the head of the EC mission today. In the course of the conversation, which revolved around military and political problems, the ambassadors expressed concern over the future of the nuclear potential on the territory of the former USSR.

In an interview with the Mayak radio station, Piskunov, deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet Committee for Defense and Security, admitted that the process of the ratification of the treaty on strategic offensive weapons has been suspended.

[Begin Piskunov recording] The treaty must be ratified on a bilateral basis—by the United States and by Russia as the successor of the USSR. This procedure was coordinated beforehand with three other CIS states that have nuclear weapons on their territory. At the concluding stage in Kiev, however, Ukraine effectively foiled the conclusion of the draft agreement because of just one word. At the beginning, it was Kazakhstan that wanted to remove brackets from the word in question. But then this position was developed by Ukraine, and the signing of the agreement was foiled.

In these conditions, parliament had to suspend ratification. A fundamentally new situation has arisen. I believe that in many respects it is the consequence of the provision under which strategic nuclear forces have no state status in this country. They belong to the CIS, something that is unacceptable from the point of view of international bodies. There must be someone clearly in charge of issues relating to nuclear security and responsibility for everything that can happen to nuclear weapons.

The Russian Federation has been instructed now to find methods as soon as possible for coordinating existing positions and for removing the obstacles that have arisen to concluding the treaty. [end recording]

Delegation Questions Status of Nuclear Weapons

LD1004083192 Kiev Ukrayinske Radio First Program Network in Ukrainian 0500 GMT 7 Apr 92

[Excerpts] A delegation from the Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War organization visited all the countries of the CIS that have nuclear weapons. [passage omitted] On 6 April, the delegation had a conversation

with Volodymyr Hrynyov, deputy chairman of the parliament. Professor Bernard Lown, head of the delegation, presented the program worked out by his organization, which is directed at the total destruction of all nuclear weapons.

[Begin Lown recording in English fading to Ukrainian] As far as we know, the Ukrainian Government treats this problem very seriously and considers it necessary to get totally rid of (?nuclear) weapons, says Professor Lown. However, we do not see quite clearly the position of Ukraine on certain questions. For example, who controls the 27,000 nuclear warheads stationed on the territory of Ukraine? When we were in Moscow, continued Professor Lown, Gennadiy Burbulis told us that the only state who controls the nuclear weapons on the territory of the former USSR is Russia, which acts as a legal successor to the USSR in that sphere. We are also concerned, continues Professor Lown, by how the process of the destruction of the nuclear weapons stationed in Ukraine is going. [end recording]

The nuclear-free status of Ukraine has already been declared in the most important documents which assert

Ukraine's sovereignty, replied Volodymyr Hrynyov, deputy head of the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine.

[Begin Hrynyov recording in Russian] There is no doubt about the nuclear-free status of Ukraine being included in our new constitution. It is a position of the principle of Ukraine today, and it will not, it seems to me, undergo any changes in the foreseeable future. I would be wrong if I did not indicate those difficulties which we come across in reality on the path to a nuclear-free status. [passage omitted] Ukraine will not just try to implement the idea of its nuclear-free status but, I think, it will also not break the framework of removing the nuclear weapons from its territory. The question of control over nuclear weapons on the territory of Ukraine is very important and serious now. What Gennadiy Burbulis said is not quite right. Indeed, Ukraine does not have the possibility to use nuclear weapons on its territory. But at the same time, Ukraine has the right of veto on the use of these weapons. And the last thing. It is to do with the testing of nuclear weapons. We believe that nuclear weapons should not be perfected further. Its current technical condition is quite enough for beginning the process of total nuclear disarmament. [end recording] [passage omitted]

AUSTRIA

Police Seize Smuggled Plutonium, Uranium*AU2703131392 Vienna KURIER in German
27 Mar 92 pp 1-2*

[Report by Rupert Haberson: "Two Austrians Apprehended For Smuggling Nuclear Material"]

[Text] Two Austrians suspected of having smuggled plutonium and uranium into Switzerland were apprehended in Zurich on 23 March. The quality of the nuclear material is not yet known and is allegedly of a minor quantity without dangerous radiation.

In addition to apprehending two Austrian citizens called Woess and Obermueller, the Swiss police also seized the smuggled, allegedly radioactive material: plutonium and some uranium, which are poisonous and dangerous and used for atom bombs. The nuclear material is currently being examined in strictest secrecy. How dangerous it is and whether it is suitable for building atomic bombs is not yet known.

Reportedly, the nuclear material has no dangerous radiation. Allegedly, it is a small quantity and weighs between a few hundred grams and half a kilogram. The possibility cannot be ruled out, however, that the seized nuclear material was just a test delivery for the customers and that further deliveries were to follow. The authorities in Switzerland are currently trying to find the original suppliers of the seized plutonium and uranium.

One of the two Austrians, who probably was just the driver, has meanwhile been released. The other one is reportedly in prison.

Responding to a question on the subject by KURIER, Foreign Minister Mock confirmed the facts on 26 March: "The Foreign Ministry has been informed of the arrests and the confiscation of the material."

But "even though it may just be a small quantity of radioactive material without dangerous radiation," the incident is reason enough for Mock to urge stricter controls more intensively: "The whole matter shows the risks involved connected with the USSR's disintegration. The danger of people dealing in such substances is looming dramatically."

Mock declines "to speculate on whether the nuclear material comes from the CIS." But, he cites the suggestion made by OeVP [Austrian People's Party] presidential candidate Thomas Klestil that "the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] should be involved to a larger extent to prevent fissionable material from getting into the wrong hands." Mock sent a letter to IAEA President Blix to this effect, saying that "this agency should play a larger role in supervising the destruction of nuclear weapons and preventing deals with weapons-grade nuclear material. In this context, it must also be guaranteed that no

material disappears on its way to destruction. Implementing these plans, however, requires international coordination and agreement."

FRANCE

Atomic Energy Agency Creates Japanese Subsidiary*92WS0341B Paris AFP SCIENCES in French
30 Jan 92 p 30*

[Text] Paris—France's COGEMA [General Nuclear Materials Company] group, a CEA [Atomic Energy Commission] subsidiary, announced in a press release on 27 January, that it has created, in Tokyo and in effect from 6 January, a subsidiary under Japanese law, the COGEMA JAPAN COMPANY. The new company will be headed by Mr. Arthur de Montalembert. Since 1984, COGEMA has maintained a liaison office responsible for "facilitating the group's relations with its customers, and in particular with the nine Japanese private electric power companies and Japan's governmental authorities."

The transformation of its liaison office into a subsidiary company—says COGEMA—reflects "the increase in the number of tasks being entrusted to this local establishment, particularly on behalf of the different subsidiaries of the group," which "occupies first place in the world nuclear-fuel-cycle products and services market. A third of COGEMA's annual revenue—21.5 billion francs in 1991—is realized abroad. Its top customer is Japan, to which it sells mainly uranium and nuclear engineering services.

GERMANY

Stoltenberg on Nuclear Arms in Western Europe*AU2803093092 Hamburg BILD in German
27 Mar 92 pp 1, 2*

[Interview with Defense Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg by "RB"; place and date not given: "Boys Join Up Again"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] [BILD] How many states will have nuclear arms in the future?

[Stoltenberg] The number of states that have nuclear arms or are anxious to have or produce them is clearly increasing. Whether it will be 18 or 20 by the year 2000 is hard to say today. Yet, the trend is obvious, which is one of the reasons why, now as then, the Federal Government considers a minimum number of nuclear arms in Western Europe to be necessary.

[BILD] Will there soon be four nuclear powers on the territory of the former Soviet Union?

[Stoltenberg] The central control over nuclear arms agreed upon by the new CIS republics in January can no longer be guaranteed. Kazakhstan wants to retain its

nuclear arms for the time being. From the Ukraine, there have been reports that the removal of nuclear arms there has been stopped. These are warning signals.

Help Urged for CIS Nuclear Weapons Destruction

AU2903145392 Munich SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG
in German 28-29 Mar 92 p 6

[Report by "cas": "Bonn Called Upon To Help Destroy Weapons"]

[Text] Because of problems the CIS is having on agreeing to a plan for destroying the former Soviet Union's tactical nuclear weapons, the FDP [Free Democratic Party] and the CDU [Christian Democratic Union] are planning to introduce in the Bundestag a joint motion on disarmament help for Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan. Disarmament policy spokesmen Olaf Feldmann (FDP) and Peter-Kurt Wuerzbach (CDU) said in Bonn on 27 March that Germany should focus on help

regarding centrally storing weapons under international control and converting fissionable nuclear material.

Feldmann and Wuerzbach said the nuclear weapons systems not only endanger European security but that "the greatest danger of proliferation emanates from these weapons." Both experts are worried that such weapons are being given to other states, which is why the comprehensive control of the transport, storage, and future destruction of these weapons must be ensured as soon as possible, to include the detailed registration of and information on the existing weapons. Both politicians hold the view that the first necessary step is coordinating bilateral disarmament help from the West. They say the NATO "Ad Hoc Group" founded at Bonn's insistence should play a decisive role; the tasks should be reasonably divided. They believe that it would be the right task for Germany to help store the weapons and convert the fissionable material. Bonn is one of the Nonproliferation Treaty signatories that does not possess nuclear weapons.

NATO Concerned Over Nuke Transfer to Russia

*OW1004020092 Beijing XINHUA in English
0121 GMT 10 Apr 92*

[Text] Brussels, April 9 (XINHUA)—NATO said on Thursday that it was seriously concerned over the continuing suspension of transfers of nuclear weapons from Ukraine to Russia.

A NATO statement said NATO had "conveyed to the Russian and Ukrainian authorities serious concerns about the continuing suspension."

According to the statement, a NATO Council meeting attended by NATO ambassadors on Wednesday had focused discussion on the disputes between Ukraine and Russia concerning the issue of withdrawing and destroying those weapons.

"Allies referred to the commitments undertaken in the Alma-Ata and Minsk Accords on the control and disposition of tactical nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union," it said.

"Allies urged that the July 1 deadline previously agreed for the completion of this transfer be met," it stressed.

NATO called on the two parties to take efficient measures to resume the transfer process.

It was the first time since Ukraine declared a suspension of the transfer of those nuclear weapons to Russia in mid-March that NATO had publicly expressed "serious concerns" over the disputes over the transfer of hundreds of tactical nuclear warheads deployed on Ukrainian soil by the former Soviet Union.

NACC, Italy Launch Nuclear Assistance to CIS

*AU0204122892 Rome ANSA in English 1003 GMT
2 Apr 92*

[Text] (ANSA) Brussels, April 1—Italy will send a mission of nuclear technicians and experts to the Russian Federation some time over the first half of April to cooperate with Moscow officials in setting up safeguards during the transport and storage of atomic weapons

destined to be removed from what during the cold war were considered front line emplacements.

The announcement was made here today by Italian Defense Minister Virginio Rognoni on the sidelines of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) meeting which for the first time has seen defense ministers from the Atlantic alliance and those from the disbanded Warsaw Pact and the former Soviet republics sitting down at the same table at the NATO general headquarters in Brussels.

Rognoni said that the Italian experts, whose mission comes at the request of Moscow officials, will all be civilians who work for the Italian National Alternative Energy Agency (ENEA) but who will operate in contact with the Defense Ministry. They are to put their experience at the service of their hosts in the delicate task of maintaining controls over the nuclear arms in the possession of the former Soviet republics now a part of the Commonwealth of Independent States.

The Italian defense minister, who during the NACC meeting took the initiative of proposing such controls, told journalists that the Western nations want to be certain that the nuclear weapons that belonged to the former Soviet Union and which are to be destroyed in line with treaties stipulated previously with the USSR, are effectively eliminated and that safety measures are in force regarding the transport and storage of those nuclear weapons that remain.

The NACC today launched a broad program of technical assistance to the former communist states and CIS republics for the reconversion of their military structures to peaceful means and Rognoni said that, together with the control of nuclear arsenals, the other problem that remains to be solved with the West's former adversaries is that of ratification of the 1990 treaty for the reduction of conventional arms in Europe.

According to the minister, ratification of this treaty and agreement on how the former Soviet republics are to share out ceilings on conventional arms which were already agreed upon by the USSR, must be achieved in time for the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe set for July in Helsinki, so that participants can get on with further arms reductions.

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